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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Disasters befall developing and developed countries alike.1  Scholars have 
long grappled with questions of how disasters can be prevented and 
governed, and how victims of disasters can be compensated.2 
Traditionally, a distinction is made between technological disasters and 
natural disasters.  This distinction is founded in logic; as tort law can easily 
be applied to man-made technological disasters because a tortfeasor can be 
identified and held liable.  It is much more difficult to identify a tortfeasor 
responsible for natural disasters because they are said to be caused by force 
majeure, an “Act of God.”  Consequently, natural disasters are seemingly 
excluded from the realm of tort law. 
However, this distinction between technological disasters and natural 
ones is not so simple.  Nature may cause a disaster, but the scope of the 
damage can be exacerbated by human mistakes.  For example, constructing 
residences in a flood plain or failing to take preventive measures to minimize 
the harm caused by natural disasters largely increases the magnitude of the 
resulting damage.  Preventive measures like structurally changing river 
shapes to provide additional buffer basin to mitigate flooding damage and 
employing building techniques to reduce the impact of an earthquake on 
dwellings3 highlight that governments, not individuals, have the capacity to 
take these overarching preventive measures.4  Consequently, liability for the 
consequences of a natural disaster may be imposed on the government. 
The increased occurrence and magnitude of natural disasters caused by 
climate change exemplify the point that man’s actions play a role in causing 
                                                                                                                   
 1 The losses due to disasters have increased considerably over the last decades.  See, e.g., 
Laurens M. Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate 
Change?, 92 BULL. AM. METEOR. SOC’Y 39, 43 (2011) (discussing increased economic losses 
resulting from climate change-influenced disasters).  
 2 See, e.g., VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (2010); see also FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (Michael 
Faure & Ton Harlief eds., 2006); see generally ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettle & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2006).   
 3 See, e.g., T. Imai, Earthquake Insurance on Dwelling Risks in Japan, in ASIAN 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 59–77 (C.H. Scawthorn & K. Kobayashi eds., 2008).   
 4 See Michael Faure, Towards Effective Compensation for Victims of Natural Catastrophes 
in Developing Countries, in REGULATING DISASTERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
HARM: LESSONS FROM THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 243–45 (Michael Faure & Andri 
Wibisana eds., 2013). 
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the resulting damage.5  Even though liability rules in climate change cases 
cannot be neatly applied, scholars increasingly debate and consider the 
possibility of imposing such liability.6  
This Article will focus on distributing liability for industrial accidents 
triggered by natural disasters like the incident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear 
reactor, which resulted from a March 11, 2011 tsunami.  While natural 
disasters are generally excluded from tort liability, excluding industrial 
operators from liability altogether when an industrial accident was triggered 
by a natural disaster may be too easy of a solution if the damage could have 
been mitigated by preventive measures that were not taken.  The Fukushima 
case is illustrative in this respect. There, the nuclear reactor meltdown 
occurred primarily because both the original and the reserve generators for 
the cooling system were placed at a low level in the nuclear power plant 
which was located in an area vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis.  
Consequently, the nuclear reactors were vulnerable to flooding.7  Should the 
entity responsible for the power plant’s faulty design and operation be 
excluded from liability simply because a force majeure triggered the natural 
disaster? 
We will address this question by first providing a few theoretical 
observations based on economic analysis of the deterrent function of liability 
rules.  Next, we will discuss United States case law concerning natural 
disasters, force majeure, and the way natural disasters and force majeure are 
treated in cases involving nuclear accidents.  We will then examine two 
exemplary Asian cases: the Indonesian mudflow highlighting the difficulties 
in distinguishing between technological and natural disasters, and Fukushima 
highlighting how technological flaws and natural disasters together caused 
the damage. 
II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The economic analysis of accident law is helpful in assessing whether 
liability should stem from an industrial accident caused by a natural disaster 
                                                                                                                   
 5 See Richard Zeckhauser, The Economics of Catastrophes, 12 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 134 
(1996). 
 6 See on this issue inter alia the contributions in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY (Michael 
Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2011). 
 7 See J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: 
The Case of Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 457 (2011); see also Michael Faure & 
Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 2011 and the Subsequent Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: 
Who Compensates the Victims, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 202–03 (2012). 
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because it posits that liability exposure will provide operators incentives to 
take preventive measures.8  Potential liability would cause operators to weigh 
cost and benefits and ultimately adopt optimal care and activity levels.9  
A.  Act of God and Efficient Liability Rules 
The Latin maxim actus dei nemini facit injuriam stands for the common 
principle that the law should hold no man responsible for the Act of God.10  
The law and economics scholarship generally supports this principle.  For 
example, Landes and Posner argue that holding one liable for the damage 
resulting from an Act of God will not result in allocative gains, since liability 
cannot deter a similar damage in the future.11  Standard tort law economic 
analysis considers the goal of tort law to be minimizing the expected social 
costs of accident ?????, where ????? is the sum of cost of care, , plus the 
expected harm which depends on the level of care, ?????.  Following Cooter 
and Ulen, the expected social costs of an accident is denoted as:12 
 
????? ? ?? ? ?????? ????? 
 
The optimal level of care, ??, is a level of care that minimizes the 
expected costs of accident, ?????.  Where the level of care is optimal, the 
marginal cost of care will equal the reduction of expected harm, that is: 
? ?????(????? ????? 
It follows from (1) and (2) that both the negligence rule and strict liability 
will induce the injurer to take the optimal level of care.  Under the 
negligence rule, the injurer will choose ?? since, by taking this level of care, 
she will avoid being held liable for the harm, A.  Under strict liability, the 
injurer will take ?? since this level of care will result in the least expected 
costs of accident ?????.13 
                                                                                                                   
 8 This has been developed by Steven Shavell among others.  See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 297–98 (1987).  
 9 Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).  
 10 C.G. Hall, An Unsearchable Providence: The Lawyer’s Concept of Act of God, 13 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 229 (1993).   
 11 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic 
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 117 (1983).  
 12 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 200–01 (6th ed. 2012).  
 13 Id. at 203–07. 
wx
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Although both the negligence rule and strict liability can induce the 
injurer to take the optimal level of care, they are different in their impacts on 
the optimal level of activity.  Since under the negligence rule the injurer will 
not be liable so long as he takes the optimal level of care, he will not have 
incentives to reduce his activity level up to the optimal level (or to take the 
optimal level of activity).  In contrast, since strict liability will hold the 
injurer liable anytime the damage occurs, the injurer will also take the 
optimal level of activity in order to reduce the chance of accident and being 
held liable.14  
The presence of a possible Act of God changes (1).  When the court 
accepts the defense of an Act of God, the probability of an accident depends 
solely on the Act of God, and does not depend on the injurer’s negligence.  
Hence, this situation basically shows that the change in the probability of 
accident with respect to the change in the injurer’s level of care is zero.15   
Since  the marginal cost of care equals the reduction of expected harm 
resulting from the change in the injurer’s level of care, one could conclude 
that holding the injurer liable for an accident arising from his negligence is 
enough to induce him to take the optimal level of care.16  In this situation, as 
long as the cost of taking the optimal level of care is less than the expected 
liability, the injurer will be induced to take the optimal level of care in order 
to avoid liability.   
In addition, it could also be concluded that similar incentives to take the 
optimal level of care will also apply under strict liability.  When the defense 
of an Act of God is accepted, the injurer will be liable for the damage 
resulting only from his activity.  Thus, he will take the optimal level of care, 
since this is the level that minimizes total expected costs. 
B.  Act of God and the Scope of Liability 
The question arises, of course, whether and under what conditions the 
court will accept the Act of God defense, and hence interpret that the change 
in the probability of accident with respect to the change in the injurer’s level 
of care is zero.  Such a question corresponds to the issue of what has been 
termed as the scope of liability.  Ben-Shahar considers the scope of liability 
as a causation restriction, consisting of a set of circumstances where liability 
                                                                                                                   
 14 Id. at 212. 
 15 See Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 114. 
 16 Id.  
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applies.  Accordingly, the scope of liability determines that an injurer is 
liable when his level of care is a necessary cause of harm; his level of care is 
a necessary cause if a different level of care would have led to another level 
of harm.  The scope of liability is considered restricted if there are 
circumstances under which the injurer is not liable despite the presence of 
some harms.  In contrast, the scope of liability is unrestricted if the injurer 
will always be liable any time harm occurs, regardless of the circumstances 
surrounding the harm.17 
It is likely that the scope of liability is set at the optimal level, whereby 
the injurer is liable only for the harm arising from his act (or his lack of care 
under the negligence rule).  Under an optimal scope of liability, the injurer is 
not liable for harm that was not caused by his act, namely when the change 
of injurer’s care did not alter the probability of harm.  However, it is likely 
that the scope of liability is inefficiently unrestricted such that the injurer is 
held liable although his level of care did not alter the probability of harm.  In 
contrast, it is also likely that the injurer is not liable although his act did 
change the expected harm.  This is a situation of an inefficiently restricted 
scope of liability, where the injurer is not held liable although the change in 
the injurer’s level of care might also contribute to the accident given the 
presence of an Act of God.  
Law and economics scholarship indicates that these sets of liability scope 
each give rise to different incentives for the injurer to take the optimal levels 
of care and activity.  For example, under the negligence rule, the unrestricted 
scope of liability might lead to increased administrative costs associated with 
the use of lawsuits, but the injurer will still be induced to take the optimal 
level of care.  In this case, “imposing liability for negligence where care 
would not have avoided the accident could produce an inefficient reduction 
in the injurer’s activity level.”18  However, if the scope of liability is too 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON. 
644, 644–49 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, 
Causation and Foreseeability, 2000].  See also Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, 
in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 83, 87 (Michael Faure ed., 2009) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, 
Causation and Foreseeability, 2009].  According to Shavell, the scope of liability can be 
restricted by following the “cause-in-fact” principle, i.e., the test indicating that harm would not 
have occurred but for the injurer’s act.  In addition, the scope of liability can also be restricted for 
some other grounds, e.g., that the injurer’s act was not the “proximate cause” of the harm, that 
after the injurer’s act there was an “unforeseeable intervening cause,” or that the harm was a 
freak occurrence.  See Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the 
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.  463, 463–64 (1980).  Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 118. 
 18 Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 118. 
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restricted, the injurer will not have incentives to take the optimal level of 
care or to reduce his level of activity.19 
Under strict liability, an unrestricted scope of liability will induce the 
injurer to take the optimal level of care as he can be held liable for any harm.  
In addition, since he will be liable for any harm, the injurer will significantly 
reduce the level of activity and will perhaps withdraw from activity.  If the 
injurer’s engagement in his activity is socially desirable, strict liability 
presents a serious problem.  People may withdraw from socially beneficial 
activities in order to avoid liability.  Such an unfortunate situation, resulting 
from what is called by Shavell as “crushing liability,”20 is to be avoided by 
restricting liability.  The problem is, however, inefficiently restricting the 
scope of liability will lessen the incentives to take the optimal level of care 
meaning fewer incentives to take care in preventing harm.21 
The above discussions on the scope of liability are crucial for the analysis 
of the Act of God defense.  Defined too broadly, the use of the Act of God 
defense significantly limits the scope of liability and the injurer might have 
fewer incentives to take the optimal level of care.  Defined too narrowly, the 
defense may inefficiently broaden the scope of liability, which could 
eventually lead to a less than optimal level of activity.  But this disadvantage 
may be outweighed by the advantages. 
C.  Foreseeability and Uncertainty Over Causation 
An Act of God could be seen as an unforeseeable factor which intervenes 
in the injurer’s act.  In this regard, the injurer should not be held liable for 
harm resulting from an event that is considered unlikely to occur.  Indeed, 
one cannot be required to prevent a harm of which the probability is zero.  
Hence, liability for this type of harm will not induce the injurer to take 
optimal precaution ex ante.    
An important question in determining whether an event is unforeseeable 
is which type of probability should be taken into account.  Shavell defines 
unforeseeability as an event of which the probability has been 
underestimated by the injurer.  In this regard, Shavell argues that the 
inclusion of an accident overlooked by the injurer in the scope of liability 
will not have any effect on the injurer’s behavior since this behavior will be 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Shavell, supra note 17, at 487–88.  
 20 Id. at 465.  
 21 Id. at 484.  
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dependent on the injurer’s subjective probability.22  However, as Shavell also 
indicates, the foreseeability test for liability might reduce the incentives for 
the injurer to carefully take into account the potential impacts of his action.23  
One could also find that employing subjective probability in determining 
the unforeseeability might lead to a situation where the injurer’s subjective 
probability is systematically lower than that of the court or a reasonable man.  
In this situation, the injurer may potentially argue that he could not have 
foreseen the occurring harm, although similar harm had once occurred or it 
was within the risks of the injurer’s activity.  If the injurer is allowed to use 
such an argument in order to establish the unforeseeability of harm, one 
could expect that this will significantly reduce the injurer’s incentive to 
anticipate and prevent the harm that, in the court’s opinion, should have been 
foreseen.   
Finally, the Act of God defense might also correspond to the issue of 
uncertainty over causation.  In this regard, two familiar approaches in 
addressing the uncertainty are the all-or-nothing and the proportional liability 
approaches.  Under the all-or-nothing approach, the injurer will be held liable 
for all harm once it is established that the probability that the injurer’s act 
caused the harm exceeds the probability threshold, usually the preponderance 
of the evidence rule.24  In contrast, under the proportional liability approach, 
the injurer’s liability is proportional to the probability that his act is the cause 
of the harm.25  Shavell argues that the proportional liability approach is 
superior to the all-or-nothing approach because proportional liability induces 
the injurer to take both socially optimal levels of care and activity if strict 
liability is applied and leads to the optimal level of care if the negligence rule 
is applied.  These results do not hold for the all-or-nothing approach.26  The 
issue of uncertainty over causation is of high importance in determining 
                                                                                                                   
 22 Id. at 490.  Shavell also describes some findings in behavioral economics indicating that 
people tend to underestimate the probability of an event that is hard to imagine or not 
memorable.  Id. at 491.   
 23 Id. at 492.  Similarly, Ben-Shahar argues that including unforeseen harms in the scope of 
liability might have the positive impact of inducing the injurer to find out information about 
the consequences of this action.  See Ben-Shahar, Cause and Foreseeability, 2009, supra note 
17, at 101.  
 24 Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159 (1983).  
 25 Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, 2000, supra note 17, at 652–53.  
 26 Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 
J.L. & ECON.  587, 596–99 (1985).  
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liability where an Act of God comingled with the injurer’s act resulted in the 
victim’s harm.  
D.  Summary 
The above overview highlights the fact that there is no easy, 
straightforward answer as to how the Act of God defense should be treated, 
especially when it is triggering an industrial accident.  The Act of God is not 
in the injurer’s scope of control, but the industrial accident may be within the 
injurer’s scope of control.  The difficulty in determining the proper scope of 
liability in such a case lies in determining what it means that the natural 
disaster “caused” the industrial accident.  The crucial question then becomes: 
Notwithstanding the Act of God (like a natural disaster), could the operator 
have taken efficient measures either to prevent the occurrence of the incident 
or limit the scope of the harm?  If the answer to the question is yes, 
excluding liability of the operator simply because the incident was related to 
an Act of God would clearly be inefficient.  From this, other pertinent 
questions arise, such as whether a natural disaster is unforeseeable or within 
the scope of causal uncertainty, and to what extent the harm was caused by 
the natural disaster itself, the operator’s negligence, or both. 
Notwithstanding the nuances of the presented economic analysis, it is 
clear that exposing an operator to liability for harm which he could not 
reasonably have prevented (since the event was caused by a natural disaster–
an Act of God) would clearly be inefficient.  Such liability exposure would 
not increase prevention incentives because the event would be totally 
unforeseeable.  Exposure to liability would only deter economic efficient 
activity.  However, excluding liability of the operator just because the event 
was triggered by a natural disaster would lead to under deterrence to the 
extent that the operator could have foreseen the natural disaster (e.g., because 
his facility was built in an earthquake or flood prone area) and could thus 
have taken efficient preventive measures to reduce the probability of the 
incident occurring or the magnitude of the harm.  Therefore, determining to 
what extent the industrial incident triggered by a natural disaster was 
foreseeable and to what extent the harm could have been prevented is crucial.  
If the operator could foresee the natural disaster and the lack of preventative 
measures by the operator caused the accident, imposing liability is 
reasonable.  If, however, the operator’s negligence in not taking sufficient 
preventive measures only contributed to the probability of the accident or to 
an increase in the magnitude of the harm, then magnitude of this proportion 
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should be assessed.  In that case, like with uncertainty over causation, a 
proportional liability approach could be applied. 
The extent to which it is merely the natural disaster, the operator’s failure 
to foresee the disaster and take appropriate preventive measures, or a 
combination of both is of course a factual and technical matter.  Therefore, 
we will now turn to the case law in the United States, showing how courts 
have dealt with these questions. 
III.  ACT OF GOD IN U.S. LAW 
In cases involving a natural cause defenses, all courts are faced with 
difficulties in deciding the case amidst scientific and technical debates 
concerning the true causes of harm.  Unfortunately, some courts may also 
have difficulties finding accepted authority regarding the use of natural cause 
as a defense.  In Indonesia, for example, there are no Indonesian textbooks or 
scientific articles on tort law that specifically discuss the meaning of a 
natural cause from a legal perspective.  This is, however, not the case in the 
United States.  There are various discussions on the natural cause, or Act of 
God, defense.27 
Rulings of U.S. courts show the application of principled rules usually 
requires the party invoking the Act of God defense to prove some elements 
of the defense.  These elements will be discussed below. 
In defining an Act of God, some U.S. courts have emphasized the 
exceptional character of a disaster in being unpreventable and unavoidable.  
For example, in Apex Oil Company, Inc. v. United States the court defined an 
Act of God as “unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the 
effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of 
due care or foresight.”28  The court referred to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
stating that whether or not the Act of God defense will be accepted depends 
                                                                                                                   
 27 In fact, one can find an article on the use of the Act of God defense, which was published 
as early as 1883.  In that article, Murfree, Sr. contrasts the Act of God with that of humans.  
The author argues that the Act of God is “something in opposition to the act of man; for 
everything is the Act of God that happens by His permission; everything by His knowledge.”  
W.L. Murfree, Sr., The Act of God, 16 CENT. L.J. 182, 182 (1883).  The author also notes that 
in the case invoking the Act of God defense, the defendant bears the burden to prove not only 
that the damage was caused by an Act of God, but also that there was no possibility to prevent 
the loss, and no defendants’ negligence contributed to the realization of the loss.  Id. at 184. 
 28 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (E.D. La. 2002). 
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on the evidence of whether the disaster is exceptional, inevitable, and 
irresistible in nature.29 
Other rulings emphasize the absence of human intervention and 
reasonable capacity to foresee or prevent the disaster.  In Joseph Resnick, Co. 
v. Kaisha, the court referred to the definition of the natural disaster given by 
Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines a natural disaster as: 
Any misadventure or casualty is said to be caused by the “Act 
of God” when it happens by the direct, immediate, and 
exclusive operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or 
uninfluenced by the power of man and without human 
intervention, and is of such a character that it could not have 
been prevented or escaped from by any amount of foresight or 
prudence, or by any reasonable degree of care or diligence, or 
by the aid of any appliances which the situation of the party 
might reasonably require him to use.30 
Another definition of a natural disaster is given by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Carlson v. Corrugated Box Corp.  In this case, the court 
interpreted a natural disaster as “an unusual, extraordinary, sudden, and 
unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature which cannot be prevented 
by human care, skill or foresight.”31 
Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court in McFeeters v. Renollet formulated a 
natural disaster as “an irresistible superhuman cause such as no reasonable 
human foresight, prudence, diligence and care can anticipate and prevent; 
                                                                                                                   
 29 The court stated that:  
The defense for the exceptional natural phenomenon is similar to, but more 
limited in scope than, the traditional ‘Act of God’ defense.  It has three 
elements: the natural phenomenon must be exceptional, inevitable, and 
irresistible.  Proof of all three elements is required for successful assertion of 
the defense.  The ‘Act of God’ defense is more nebulous, and many 
occurrences asserted as ‘acts of God’ would not qualify as ‘exceptional 
natural phenomenon.’ 
For example, a major hurricane may be an Act of God, but in an area (and at a time) 
where a hurricane should not be unexpected, it would not qualify as a “phenomenon 
of exceptional character.”  Id. at 653. 
 30 241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136.  A similar definition can also be found in other rulings, such as 
Butts v. City of South Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); McWilliams v. Masterson, 
112 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. 2003); Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1970); and 
Utilities Pipeline Co. v. Am. Petrofina Mktg., 760 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1988). 
 31 72 A.2d 290, 291 (Pa. 1950). 
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and to be a defense must be an intervening cause which was not foreseeable 
and the consequences of which could not be prevented.”32 
Based on the definitions above, in order to be qualified as a defense to 
escape liability, an Act of God should meet the requirements of being grave, 
unforeseeable, and free from human intervention.33  These requirements will 
be elaborated in the following sections. 
A.  Elements of an Act of God 
1.  An Act of God Should Be Grave 
Generally, courts require an Act of God to be grave or severe in 
magnitude.  This held true in Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. v. United 
States, where the party invoking the defense was required to demonstrate that 
the Act of God was of great magnitude.34  The court, in rejecting the 
                                                                                                                   
 32 500 P.2d 47, 48 (Kan. 1972). 
 33 One must note that other commentators might observe more or less requirements in 
examining the Act of God defense.  For example, Rundall has proposed a two-tier test for the 
Act of God defense.  In the first tier, the defendant must prove that an event claimed as an Act 
of God can indeed be qualified as an Act of God.  Once the act is qualified as an Act of God, 
the second test takes place.  In this test, the defendant has the burden to prove that the Act of 
God is the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss.  See Marsha T.  Rundall, “Act of God” 
as a Defense in Negligence Cases, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 754, 761–62 (1976).  However, it could 
also be argued that the first tier test is indeed the test to show that the claimed Act of God is 
both grave in magnitude and unforeseeable.  Other commentators even observe four 
requirements in examining the Act of God defense, namely: first, that the event was a grave 
natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character; second, whether 
the event was anticipated; third, whether the event was the sole cause; and fourth, whether the 
consequences of the event could have been prevented by due care or foresight.  See Joel 
Eagle, Divine Intervention: Re-Examining the “Act of God” Defense in a Post-Katrina World, 
82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 459, 476–87 (2007); see also Casey P. Kaplan, The Act of God 
Defense: Why Hurricane Katrina and Noah’s Flood Don’t Qualify, 26 REV. LITIG. 155, 175–
76 (2007).  It should be noted here that the examination of whether the claimed Act of God is 
unforeseeable also includes the discussion about the foreseeability of its consequences, and, 
hence, also includes the fourth requirement under the four requirements above. 
 34 Ralph M. Sugg, Blame It on the Rain? El Niño is No Excuse to Pollute, 21 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 737, 752 (2000).  In Sabine Towing & Transp., Co. v. United States, the Sabine Towing 
filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Government.  The plaintiff challenged the Government 
decision requiring the plaintiff to conduct a cleanup for oil spills from the plaintiff’s vessel 
which ruptured after striking unknown objects in the Hudson River.  When the vessel was 
moving in the Hudson River, there was a freshet condition in the River, as a result of spring 
runoff of melted snow, which apparently not only increased the level of the River, but also 
brought sediment, gravel, logs, rocks and other debris.  The vessel inadvertently hit unknown 
objects in the River, which then ruptured the vessel’s hull and tank.  The cleaning cost the 
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plaintiff’s Act of God defense, declined to categorize both spring runoff of 
melted snow and the unknown objects that ruptured the ship’s hull as a 
natural disaster.35  Eagle observes that the key to passing the test of gravity 
for an Act of God defense is to show that an event was not only much more 
grave and exceptional compared to other past Act of God cases, but one of 
the most exceptional character.36  In this regard, one may see that the element 
of gravity could be seen only in comparison with other similar events, in 
which the claimed Act of God must be exceptional compared to other Act of 
God events.  The California Supreme Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. City of 
Los Angeles confirmed this position by refusing to qualify rainstorms as a 
defense.  According to the Court, rainfall with the above-normal intensity 
was not a natural disaster within the context of the Act of God defense.  The 
court stated “that a rainstorm which is merely of unusual intensity is not a 
‘superhuman’ cause or Act of God, superseding the original negligence as 
the proximate cause of the injury.”37  This opinion is also expressed in 
United States v. Stringfellow,38 where the court ruled that “rains were not the 
kind of ‘exceptional’ natural phenomena to which the narrow Act of God 
defense of section 107(b)(1) applies.”39  The importance of these rulings is 
that the courts usually associate a natural event with the time and place 
where the event took place, such that if the event was common to that 
particular time and place, the courts would refuse to consider the event as 
unanticipated, and would hence, refuse the Act of God defense. 
                                                                                                                   
plaintiff incurred $113,943.41.  Sabine Towing & Transp., Co. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561, 
562–63 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
 35 Sabine Towing & Transp., Co., 666 F.2d at 565.  
 36 Eagle, supra note 33, at 479.  
 37 55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936). 
 38 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987).  In this case, the plaintiff, the U.S. Government and 
the Government of California, asked the defendants, namely a company producing, treating, 
and transporting hazardous wastes, to reimburse the cost incurred by the plaintiff to conduct 
clean-up and recovery from hazardous waste pollution.  The defendants argued that the 
pollution occurred due to heavy rains. 
 39 Id. at 1061; see also Radburn v. Fir Tree Lumber, Co., 145 P. 632, 633 (Wash. 1915) 
(rejecting an Act of God defense based on heavy rainfalls that apparently exceeded the 
Government’s official record of rainfall in the past thirteen years).  With respect to the record 
of heavy rains, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Frank v. County of Mercer considered as 
an Act of God a rainfall of more than twice the maximum that would be expected to occur 
once in a hundred years a natural disaster.  The rainfall of this level is considered so 
unprecedented and extraordinary that it fell within the Act of God defense.  186 N.W.2d 439 
(N.D. 1971). 
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It should also be noted here that a large number of court rulings explain 
the grave and exceptional characters of a natural disaster by referring to the 
question of whether the natural event was so unprecedented, unforeseeable, 
and unanticipated, that it was unpreventable or unavoidable.  Therefore, the 
actual discussion about the gravity of a natural disaster will eventually 
correspond to the ability to foresee the occurrence of a natural disaster, and 
accordingly, to prevent the disaster or to minimize the impacts if it 
nevertheless occurs.  In this way, although one might have satisfied the 
courts in showing that the claimed Act of God event was grave, one still has 
to show that the event was unforeseeable. 
2.  The Act of God and Its Impacts Should be Unforeseeable 
The second element of an Act of God, i.e., the element of unforeseeablity, 
was used by a South Carolina court to define an Act of God as an accident 
resulting from natural causes, impossible to be foreseen, and therefore 
impossible to be guarded against.40 
Unforeseeability is usually established by showing that the event is 
unprecedented in a particular area.41  Some courts interpret the term 
“unprecedented” in such a way that if a similar event has occurred any time 
before the particular event, the event will be considered foreseeable, and 
hence, the Act of God defense will fail to past the test.42  Other courts 
conclude that to qualify as an Act of God in a legal sense, an event must not 
only be unusual, but also be so unprecedented that its impacts could not be 
anticipated nor prevented.43  
When appraising the element of unforeseeability, courts usually pay a 
great deal of attention to the characteristics of time and place.  In Sky 
Aviation Corp. v. Colt, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected categorizing 
wind as a natural disaster reasoning that “[t]he ordinary force of nature such 
as winds which are usual at the time and place are conditions which 
reasonably could have been anticipated and will not relieve from liability the 
person guilty of the original negligent act.”44  One commentator concludes 
that in seeing whether an event could have been anticipated or not, courts 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Bill B. Bozeman, Note, Act of God, 4 S.C. L. Q. 421, 421 (1951).   
 41 James Lewis Howe III, Act of God: A Reconsideration, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 336, 
337 (1961). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 339.  
 44 475 P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 1970). 
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will take into account the character of the area, the surrounding 
circumstances, and the history of previous similar events in the area where 
the event took place.45 
Courts will also assess whether similar natural events have occurred prior 
to the event in question in examining unforeseeability in an Act of God.  
Hence, a natural event could be qualified as an Act of God if it was 
unprecedented.  In State v. Malone, the Texas Court of Appeals explicitly 
made a distinction between the definition of unprecedented on the one hand, 
and the definition of unusual or extraordinary on the other hand.  In this case, 
the court held that the term “unprecedented” means there is no previous 
example or a new incident, while the term “unusual” or “extraordinary” 
implies that a similar event has occurred, although rarely or infrequently.46 
More importantly, a court might also be of the opinion that a natural 
disaster, which has occurred in the past, should be seen as something that 
could recur in the future.  In this way, the disaster is considered foreseeable, 
despite the fact that it might be extraordinary in nature.  In this context, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, in Fairbury Brick, Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. 
Co., stressed that: 
The mere fact that a flood is extraordinary is not sufficient to 
absolve the defendant from liability.  Although a rainfall may 
be more than ordinary, yet if it be such as has occasionally 
occurred at irregular intervals, it is to be foreseen that it may 
occur again; and a party engaged in a public work, the 
construction of which involves the change or restraint of the 
flow of water in a natural channel, is guilty of negligence if it 
fails to make reasonable provision for the consequences that 
will result from such extraordinary rainfalls as experience 
shows are likely to recur.47 
Furthermore, in examining whether a natural event could be considered 
unprecedented, some courts look into the ability to anticipate or foresee the 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Rundall, supra note 33, at 755.  
 46 The court stated: “ ‘Unprecedented’ means ‘having no precedent or example; novel, new, 
unexampled’ ” while the terms “ ‘Unusual’ and ‘extraordinary’ . . . presuppose other like 
occurrences, though rare or infrequent.”  State v. Malone, 168 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1943). 
 47 113 N.W. 535, 537 (Neb. 1907); see Webb v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 
18 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Neb. 1945); State v. Malone, 168 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).  
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natural phenomenon and to avoid the resulting impacts.  In this regard, the 
Missouri Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Union Electric, Co. of Missouri, held 
that “[t]he term ‘Act of God’, in its legal sense, applies only to events in 
nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other 
conditions in the particular locality afford no reasonable warning of them.”48  
Accordingly, one might conclude that information on local conditions and 
past records of natural disaster should enable the parties to anticipate the 
recurrence of the disaster.  Therefore, a natural disaster that has occurred in 
the past or is considered common should be seen as a foreseeable disaster, no 
matter how large the impact might be.  If the court thinks that such a natural 
event is foreseeable, in the terms of its occurrence and possible impacts, the 
Act of God defense is very likely to be dismissed.  The California Supreme 
Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, clearly expressed this 
position when it stated:  
There is nothing in the nature of the rainstorm involved in this 
case which makes it so totally unforeseeable as to act as a 
superseding cause.  It was simply a heavy rain, commencing 
and continuing for several days, and perhaps it established a 
record for volume in inches in that region.  But it cannot be 
concluded from this fact that the cause was wholly 
unforeseeable.  Rainfall is foreseeable in most places, and 
heavy rainfall was characteristic of that region.  There is no 
point at which an expectable heavy rain becomes an act of God 
by reason of its unusual volume.49  
The rules concerning the Act of God defense can be categorized as the 
rules regarding intervening causes.50  To qualify as an Act of God in a legal 
sense, an event should be an unforeseeable intervening cause of which 
consequences could not be prevented.  In this regard, the defendant is liable 
for both foreseeable results of foreseeable causes and for foreseeable results 
of unforeseeable causes.51 
It is important to note that the test of unforeseeability is carried out by 
referring to objective standards, in the sense that the defendant should be 
                                                                                                                   
 48 216 S.W.2d 756, 763 (Mo. 1948).  
 49 55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936).  
 50 Denis Binder, Act of God? Or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in 
Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 27 (1996). 
 51  Id. 
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able to show that the event and its consequences cannot be foreseen, 
anticipated, or prevented by a reasonable person.  In this regard, Binder 
argues that the test is about “what a reasonable person under similar 
circumstances knew, or reasonably should have known,” and not about 
“what a defendant thought.”52  In this sense, if an abnormal situation is 
foreseeable, then taking normal precaution is not enough to prove that a 
defendant has taken preventive measures to avoid the natural event and its 
consequences.53  In Phillips v. United States, the court held that the 
unforeseeability concept is flexible: If the danger is high and prevention 
relatively simple, the level of foreseeability is considered high; whereas if 
the level of danger is low and the prevention is considered difficult, the level 
of foreseeability is considered low.54  In other words, it can be argued that 
when the danger is seen to be high and the prevention is simple, everyone 
should increasingly be able to predict the danger and to take the necessary 
preventive measures.  The court further stated that foreseeability is 
determined not only on the grounds of whether a future harm is more 
probable than not, but also “whatever result is likely enough in the setting of 
modern life that a reasonable prudent person would take such into account in 
guiding reasonable conduct.”55 
It should be noted here that the majority of cases observed by 
commentators somehow correspond only to certain types of natural events, 
namely heavy rains, storms, hurricane, floods, or heavy snow.  None of these 
cases actually correspond to earthquakes.  Thus, it may appear that certain 
natural events, such as an earthquake, are still qualified as natural events that 
can be used as an Act of God defense.  This is indeed the case in Slater v. S. 
Carolina Ry. Co., in which the court clearly upheld the defendant’s claim 
bringing up an earthquake as a defense to escape liability.56 
However, one might also argue here that similar to other natural 
phenomena, not all types of earthquake should be accepted as an Act of God.  
                                                                                                                   
 52 Id. at 17. 
 53 Id. at 16–17.  
 54 801 F. Supp. 337, 345–46 (D. Idaho 1992).  
 55 Id. at 346.  This might simply mean that in assessing the level of foreseeability of an 
event, one should look at possible future consequences of the event on the basis of modern life 
(e.g., according to the development of science and technology), and then take these effects 
into account in one’s decision. 
 56 6 S.E. 936 (S.C. 1888).  It should, nevertheless, be noted here that the court also stated 
that the defendant’s Act of God defense was accepted by the court because the defense was 
not challenged by the plaintiff and its witness.  Id. at 937.  
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In this regard, only if it was extraordinary, unforeseeable, and unanticipated, 
will an earthquake be qualified as a defense to escape liability.57  
In addition, it is also important to bear in mind that the assessment of 
whether an earthquake could be qualified as an Act of God will depend not 
only on the exceptional character of the earthquake, but also on the ability of 
existing science and technology to foresee, and hence, to inform the parties 
to take the necessary anticipatory measures.  In this regard, one may refer to 
the ruling in Butts v. City of South Fulton, where the court defined a natural 
disaster as a natural phenomenon “of such character that it could not have 
been prevented or escaped from by any amount of foresight or prudence, or 
by the aid of any appliances which the situation of the party might 
reasonably require him to use.”58  The ruling indicates that courts will pay 
attention to the question of whether those who invoke the defense have 
previously applied appropriate measures, methods, or technology to prevent 
the disaster or its possible impacts.  Taking into account the rapid 
development of science and technology, an earthquake might, to some 
extent, still be reasonably considered foreseeable, anticipated, and 
preventable.  Accordingly, an earthquake should increasingly be more 
difficult to meet the requirement to be qualified as a reason to escape liability 
in the context of the Act of God defense.  
For this reason, Flatt and Kliner argue “[g]iven the current state-of-the-art 
knowledge of earthquake hazard assessment, in addition to the ability to 
provide earthquake resistant structures at a relatively nominal increase in 
cost, the Act of God defense should not be viable.”59  As such, current 
scientific understanding is relatively able to predict the possibility of an 
earthquake occurring in an active fault zone within a certain period of time 
and are thus foreseeable.60  With advanced science and technology, it 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 
Fairbury Brick, Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 113 N.W. 535 (Neb. 1907).  
 58 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis added).  
 59 William D. Flatt & Wesley R. Kliner, When the Earth Moves and Buildings Tumble, Who 
Will Pay?—Tort Liability and Defenses for Earthquake Damage within the New Madrid Fault 
Zone, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991).  
 60 In this regard, the authors argue,  
[w]ith today’s advanced research and technology, however, scientists . . . are 
better able to forecast an earthquake with an increasing degree of accuracy.  
Furthermore, advanced seismic design . . . ensures better survivability.  
Without the twin pillars of lack of predictability and lack of control, this 
defense is certainly on the wane as applied to earthquakes. 
Id. at 39. 
402 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:383 
 
 
becomes more difficult to prove that an event is indeed unforeseeable and its 
consequences are unanticipated and unpreventable. 
3.  The Act of God Should be the “Sole Cause” of Loss 
Even when an event can be considered an Act of God, the party invoking 
the defense still must prove that the Act of God is the sole cause of the loss.  
In this regard, one is actually faced with the possibility of commingling 
between natural disaster and human intervention.  The requirement of the 
sole cause is perhaps the most distinct characteristic of an Act of God 
defense.  U.S. courts have indeed shown a high degree of consistency in 
insisting that the Act of God must be the sole cause of the loss.61 
Although there is no single definition of what constitutes the “sole cause” 
of an event, Fasoyiro notes that U.S. courts often require that the act be 
“occasioned exclusively by violence of nature without the interference of any 
human action.”62  
In the case involving the negligence rule, the sole cause test will look at 
the question of whether those invoking the Act of God defense are at fault.  
Bozeman indicates that where negligence has contributed to the damage in 
question, then the damage will not be considered as resulting from the Act of 
God.63   
For example, in Oklahoma Railway, Co. v Boyd, the court held that “[o]ne 
is not liable for damage resulting solely from an ‘act of God’; but if his 
negligence is a present contributing cause, which commingled with the ‘Act 
of God,’ produces the injury, then he is liable notwithstanding the ‘act of 
God.’ ”64  From this ruling, it appears that if a natural disaster is combined 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Jill M. Fraley, Re-Examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 669, 675 (2010).  It 
should, however, be noted here that the author does not entirely agree with the requirement 
that the Act of God is the sole cause of the loss, especially for cases related to climate change.  
In this regard, the author finds that the requirement emerges from a classical legal fiction 
imagining that human acts can be meaningfully separated from the acts of nature.  According 
to the author, this separation is no longer applicable when one is examining losses due to 
climate change, as climate change itself cannot be considered an event free from human 
intervention.  Id. at 689–90. 
 62 Laurencia Fasoyiro, Invoking the Act of God Defense, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
1, 13 (2009).  
 63 Bozeman, supra note 40, at 427.  
 64 282 P. 157, 163 (Okla. 1929) (emphasis added); accord Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. 
Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ark. 1990); Beauton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 3 A.2d 315, 
318 (Conn. 1938); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Thompson, 298 N.W. 551, 554 (Neb. 1941); 
Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Ark. 1977); Oklahoma City v. Tarkington, 63 P.2d 
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with negligence on the side of the defendant, the Act of God defense will be 
rejected.  
In some rulings, courts employed a wider interpretation of the phrase 
“sole cause.”  For instance, in Butts v. City of South Fulton, the court stated 
that for an Act of God to be accepted, damages should result solely from 
natural factors, without any human intervention or any influence from “the 
power of man.”65  Similarly, in Curtis v. Dewey, the court held that “[t]he 
distinguishing characteristic of an ‘Act of God’ is that it proceeds from the 
force of nature alone, to the entire exclusion of human agency.”66 
If the court finds the damage resulted from the commingling of a natural 
disaster and human actions, either in the form of active participation, neglect, 
or the failure to act, the natural disaster will be humanized, and the damage 
will be attributed solely to human action.  Accordingly, the Act of God 
defense will be dismissed.  Such a point of view can be found in the ruling of 
Winchester Water Works Co. v. Holliday, in which the court explicitly 
rejected the Act of God holding: 
The principle embodied in all of the definitions is that the act 
must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature 
and all human agency is to be excluded from creating or 
entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the 
cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the 
result of the participation of man, whether it be from active 
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence 
is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the 
operation of the rules applicable to the acts of God.  Thus if a 
party is in default for not performing a duty or not anticipating 
a danger, or where his own negligence has contributed as the 
proximate cause of the injury complained of, he cannot avoid 
liability by claiming that it was caused by an act of God.67  
                                                                                                                   
689, 690–91 (Okla. 1936); Manila School Dis. v. Sanders, 289 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Ark. 1956); 
Rix v. Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 765, 770 (N.M. 1938); Slater v. S.C. Ry. Co., 6 S.E. 936, 937 
(S.C. 1888); Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipped AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1241–42 (S.D. Ala. 
2001); Freter v. Embassy Moving & Storage, Co., 145 A.2d 442, 444 (Md. 1958).  
 65 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). 
 66 475 P.2d 808, 810 (Idaho 1970) (emphasis added); accord Johnson v. Burley Irrigation 
Dist., 304 P.2d 912, 916 (Idaho 1956).  
 67 45 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931 (emphasis added). 
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Earlier, this Article asserted that a natural disaster qualifies as an Act of 
God if it was unforeseeable and unanticipated.  Failure to prove that a natural 
event was unforeseeable and unanticipated will bar the Act of God defense, 
mean that the defendant is negligent.  In other words, when a future natural 
event is considered foreseeable, and hence, can reasonably be anticipated, the 
defendant bears responsibility to anticipate and to take necessary 
preventative measures.  If the defendant does not anticipate and take 
preventative measures, he does not satisfy his duty of care, and he will be 
liable.  This is indicated in Justice Patterson’s dissenting opinion in Kimble v. 
Mackintosh Hemphill, Co., in which he urged that all foreseeable dangers be 
considered in determining whether an action is a negligent act.  The Justice 
stated: 
It is a primary social duty of every person to take thought and 
have a care lest his action result in injuries to others.  This 
social duty the law recognizes and enforces, and for any injury 
resulting from any person’s lack of elementary forethought, the 
law holds that person accountable.  A normal human being is 
held to foresee those injuries which are the consequences of his 
acts of omission or commission which he, as a reasonable 
human being, should have foreseen. . . . All foreseeable 
dangers are to be considered in the solution of the problem 
whether the creation of the situation was a negligent act.68  
Indeed, the examination of the sole cause corresponds to the issue of 
unforeseeability in the sense that once an Act of God and its impacts are 
considered foreseeable, then there is a legal obligation to take due care to 
prevent the act.  This obligation necessitates an examination of the 
defendant’s anticipatory actions and the Act of God’s actual consequences.  
In this regard, as Binder has indicated, the inadequacy of design, 
construction, inspection, and maintenance will result in the Act of God being 
considered as the act of people.69 
                                                                                                                   
 68 59 A.2d 68, 72 (Pa. 1948) (emphasis added). 
 69 Binder, supra note 50, at 19.   
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4.  The Act of God Defense Under Strict Liability? 
One might wonder whether strict liability still allows the defendants to 
invoke the Act of God defense.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts in § 519 
and § 520, which explain strict liability, provides no information on the use 
of the Act of God defense.70  Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23 
does not clarify the use of the Act of God defense for cases based on strict 
liability.71  The absence of such an explanation does not necessarily mean 
that the American Law Institute is of the opinion to rule out the Act of God 
defense for strict liability.  In fact, in its comment on the negligence rule, the 
Institute states that the Act of God is an affirmative defense for the strict 
liability rule announced in Rylands v. Fletcher.72  In addition, when 
explaining the scope of liability, the Institute makes a reference to some 
cases of strict liability in which the party was allowed to use the Act of God 
defense.73 
                                                                                                                   
 70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–520 (1977).  
 71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS : PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 23 (2010). 
 72 Id. § 3.  
 73 Id. § 34 cmt. d.  In this regard, the American Law Institute refers to Smith v. Bd. of 
County Rd. Comm’rs, 146 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966), Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-
Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876 (Mass. 1975), and Trotter v. Callens, 546 P.2d 867 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1976). 
  In Smith v. Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’r, the court defined an Act of God as “an intervening 
or supervening force, which relieves from liability, is such a force of nature that it is so 
calamitous, so violent and so out of line with the history of natural forces in the area as to 
completely be unforeseeable by reasonable persons.”  Further, the court held that Act of God 
is a valid defense for cases involving strict liability, and it is a question to be determined by 
the jury.  146 N.W.2d 702, 703–04. 
  In Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., the court followed previous rulings which 
acknowledge that an Act of God is an exception for liability under strict liability. 323 N.E.2d 
876, 877. 
  In Trotter v. Callens, the court even explicitly challenged the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 522, which states that “[o]ne carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject 
to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the unexpectable . . . operation 
of a force of nature.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: CONTRIBUTING ACTIONS OF THIRD 
PERSONS, ANIMALS & FORCES OF NATURE § 522 (1977).  Indeed, one might find that according 
to § 522, strict liability should not allow the use of the Act of God defense.  The court in 
Trotter v. Callens rejected such a conclusion and stated that the court “see[s] no sound reason 
in logic or policy for not allowing this [Act of God] defense.”  546 P.2d 867, 869.  Hence, 
according to this court, an Act of God could be used as a reason to escape from strict liability.  
The court further stated that “an Act of God applies only to such an extraordinary and 
unexpected manifestation of the forces of nature as cannot be prevented by human care, skill 
or foresight; that is, such a cause as would have produced the injury independent of the 
defendants’ actions.”  Id. at 869.  
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One could also take a look at several federal environmental acts, 
including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), the Oil 
Pollution Act (OPA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), which all employ strict liability 
as the rule.74  According to these acts, an Act of God is one among few valid 
reasons that can be used to escape from liability.75  It has been argued that 
precisely due to the presence of these defenses that it is called strict liability 
and not absolute liability, which provides no defense for the injurers.76  One 
court specifically stated that  
[s]trict liability under CERCLA, however, is not absolute; there 
are defenses for causation solely by an act of God, an act of 
war, or acts or omissions of a third party other than an 
employee or agent of the defendant or one whose act or 
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship 
with the defendant.77 
In Liberian Poplar Transports Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff attempted to 
get reimbursement under the FWPCA for amounts incurred to cleanup oil 
that leaked from the plaintiff’s vessels.78  The plaintiff argued that the oil 
                                                                                                                   
 74 It should be noted here that although these acts do not explicitly mention strict liability, 
scholars agree that the liability rule used by these acts is strict liability.  For comments on the 
FWPCA, see for example: Paige Kohn, Oil and Water Do Not Mix: An Argument for the 
United States Supreme Court’s Deferral to Congress in Exxon v. Baker, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 
229, 259 (2009–2010); Ryan Watson, Shifting the Costs to Those Best Able to Bear Them: An 
Argument for the Adoption of Pure Economic Loss in the Event of an Oil Pipeline Spill in 
Nebraska, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 123 (2012).  For comments on the OPA, see for 
example: Robert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua S. Force, Deep Trouble: Legal Ramifications 
of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, 
Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L. REV. 889, 899 
(2001).  See also Kohn, supra, at 260–61; Watson, supra, at 124.  For comments on 
CERCLA, see for example: ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 449–50 (7th ed. 2013); William L. Medford & Mugdha Kelkar, 
CERCLA vs. Code: Reconciling Conflicting Goals, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 46, 46 (2011); 
Lynda Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 598–603 (1993). 
 75 33 U.S.C. §§ 311(f)(1)–(3), 1003(a)–(b), § 1321(f)(1), § 2703(a)–(b); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 107(b); § 9607(b). 
 76 Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common 
Law, Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1303, 1329 (1988).  
 77 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 78 26 Cl. Ct. 223, 224 (1992). 
2015]  “ACT OF GOD” 407 
 
 
spill was caused by an Act of God, namely a storm encountered by the 
plaintiff’s vessels.  The court held that the FWPCA imposes strict liability 
upon the owner or operator of a vessel.  However, the owner or operator can 
be excluded from liability if he “can prove that one of the exceptions does 
apply.”79  Hence, the plaintiff could escape from liability if the plaintiff was 
able to establish the Act of God defense.  In this case the court followed the 
definition of an Act of God as given by the FWPCA, namely “an act 
occasioned by an unanticipated grave natural disaster.”80  The court rejected 
the plaintiff’s claim that the storm “was not well forecasted, and was not 
visually foreseeable by the ship’s watch, that the storm was not 
anticipated.”81  According to the court, the statute and the legislative history 
of the FWPCA do not rely on a subjective test to determine whether a natural 
event could be anticipated.82  In this regard, since there was in fact a forecast 
before the storm hit the location, and there was also some indication of bad 
weather issued an hour before the storm struck, the court opined that the 
storm should have been anticipated.83  Accordingly, the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s Act of God defense.84 
In Apex Oil Co. v. United States, a company sought to assert the Act of 
God defense to escape the strict liability standard under the OPA on the 
grounds that a barge accident, which led to the spills of slurry oil into the 
Mississippi River, was partly caused by an Act of God in the form of flood 
conditions.85  The court followed the definition of Act of God as explained in 
the OPA: “an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the 
effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of 
due care or foresight.”86  In addition, the court found that the congressional 
intent of the OPA indicates that the Act of God defense should be interpreted 
more narrowly than the traditional Act of God defense, in the sense that the 
interpretation should be more limited in scope.87  In order to explain what it 
meant by more limited in scope, the court referred to the rulings in United 
States v. English and Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States, which stated that the 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Id. at 225.  
 80 Id. at 226 (33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(12)).  
 81 Id.  
 82 Id. at 225–26.  
 83 Id. at 226.  
 84 Id.  
 85 208 F. Supp. 2d 651 (E.D. La. 2002). 
 86 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1)). 
 87 Id. 
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defenses under the OPA “are narrowly construed, and only in the situation 
where the discharge was totally beyond the control of the discharging vessel 
would the responsible party be excused from liability.”88  The court rejected 
the plaintiff’s claim about the presence of an Act of God, in part because the 
court found that the plaintiff knowingly entered perilous river conditions 
which were both anticipated and predicted.  Despite being fully advised of 
the conditions, the plaintiff operated barges with a tug, which had 
insufficient power to face the increasingly powerful current of the 
Mississippi River.89  The Act of God defense was also rejected because the 
plaintiff failed to show that the Act of God was the sole cause of the 
damage.90  
Several CERCLA cases have also discussed the use of Act of God 
defense to escape from liability.  For example, in United States v. Barrier 
Industries, Inc., the United States sued the owner of a hazardous waste site to 
recover costs for cleanup of the site.91  The defendant resorted to the Act of 
God defense by arguing that the spills of hazardous wastes were caused by a 
bursting of pipes due to an “unprecedented cold spell.”92  The Barrier 
Industries court rejected the defendant’s claim because the “unprecedented 
cold spell” did not fall into the category of an Act of God defense under 
CERCLA.  The court referred to the definition of an Act of God set forth in 
CERCLA as “an unanticipated natural disaster or other natural phenomenon 
of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which 
could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or 
foresight.”93  The court also contended that this definition only allows an 
exception for liability if the release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances was “solely” caused by an Act of God.  Because the accident 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Id. at 654 (citing United States v. English, 2001 WL 940946 (D. Haw.); Reliance Ins. Co. 
v. United States, 677 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).  In Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States, the Court 
further stated that “only where the owner’s or operator’s conduct was so indirect and 
insubstantial as to displace him as a causative element of the discharge would he be relieved 
of responsibility and, correspondingly, financial liability.”  677 F.2d 844, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1982).  
With this statement, it could be argued that the court in Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States has 
narrowed the interpretation of the Act of God defense by emphasizing the element of “the sole 
cause.”  In this regard, an Act of God will be considered a valid defense when the court finds 
that the act of man is so indirect and insubstantial to be regarded the cause of the damage.  Id.  
 89 See Apex Oil Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57.  
 90 Id. at 658–59.  
 91 991 F. Supp. 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1)). 
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involved some human contribution, the Court dismissed the Act of God 
defense.94 
In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., the defendant, an aluminum 
manufacturer, dumped oily wastes into a borehole that led to the Butler 
Tunnel site, a network of underground mines and related tunnels and 
waterways bordering the Susquehanna River.95  The mine workings at the 
site were drained through a tunnel that fed directly into the river.96  The U.S. 
Government sued the defendant to recover response costs.  The defendant, 
however, argued that the oil emulsion had been commingled with other oily 
wastes containing hazardous substances, which were discharged into the 
Susquehanna River in the wake of Hurricane Gloria.97  Hence, the defendant 
invoked the Act of God defense, by arguing that the release of hazardous 
substances was caused by Hurricane Gloria.  The court relied on the 
definition of an Act of God set forth in CERCLA and stated that under this 
defense no liability will be attributed to a person if that person can prove that 
the release of hazardous substances and the resulting damage were solely 
caused by an Act of God.98  The court first found no evidence indicating that 
Hurricane Gloria was the sole cause of the release of hazardous substances.  
Second, the court maintained that the impacts of Hurricane Gloria could 
“have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.”99  
If the defendant would have exercised due care it would have prevented the 
dumping of oily wastes into a borehole of mine workings.  Finally, the court 
followed the ruling in United States v. Stringfellow, which excluded heavy 
rainfall from the category of the Act of God defense.100  
As indicated above, the Act of God defense can be used as a reason to 
escape liability under strict liability.  However, one might argue that the test 
for the Act of God defense under strict liability is quite different from the test 
under the negligence rule.  The difference is especially relevant with respect 
to the test concerning the “sole cause” element of the defense.  In this case, it 
is generally accepted that under strict liability the absence of negligence will 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Id. at 679–80.  
 95 892 F. Supp. 648, 651 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 96 Id. at 651. 
 97 Id. at 652.  
 98 Id. at 649 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)). 
 99 Id. at 658. 
 100 Id.; United States v. Stringefellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987).  
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not absolve the defendant of liability.101  This means that when one invokes 
the Act of God defense under strict liability, one cannot use the reason that 
one is not negligent. This is because, as Fasoyiro observes, the test for the 
Act of God defense under strict liability is causation-based, and not fault-
based.102   
Similarly, Binder argues that since the issue of the foreseeability of the 
risk is a question of a negligence analysis, then under strict liability the 
analysis should focus on the question of whether the occurring damage falls 
within the projected risk encompassed by the application of strict liability.  If 
the answer is positive, then the unforeseeable nature of the impact is 
irrelevant.103 
Another important point to note is the tendency to interpret the Act of 
God defense rather narrowly.  As indicated especially in Liberian Poplar 
Transports, Inc. v. United States and Apex Oil Co. v. United States, courts 
are inclined to disregard the polluters’ subjective point of view with respect 
to the issue of foreseeability of harm.104  Insistence that the Act of God be the 
sole cause also exemplifies the narrow interpretation courts often take.  A 
narrow interpretation of the Act of God defense expands the scope of 
liability, making it more difficult for the injurers to escape from liability. 
5.  Causation, the Burden of Proof, and Apportionment 
All selected cases in this Article seem to indicate a general agreement that 
those who claim the presence of an Act of God must prove that the Act of 
God in question was exceptional, unforeseeable, unanticipated, and the sole 
cause of the incurred losses. The next, more important questions become 
how the defense corresponds to the question of causation and how to 
apportion damages relative to the contribution of negligence or one’s activity 
to the damage incurred.  
In the context of the Act of God defense, some courts required that a 
natural disaster should not only be a proximate cause of a loss, but should 
also be the sole cause.  In Kennedy v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, the 
                                                                                                                   
 101 See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 651, 652 (E.D. La. 2002) 
(stating that “[l]iability under the OPA and CERCLA is strict, and the absence of fault, or the 
exercise of due care is not a defense” (internal citations omitted)).  
 102 Fasoyiro, supra note 62, at 17–18.  
 103 Binder, supra note 50, at 61–64.  
 104 Liberian Poplar Transp Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 223, 226 (1992); Apex Oil Co., 
208 F. Supp. 2d at 654. 
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court established a link between an Act of God and causation, by saying that 
“the act of God was not only a proximate cause but was the sole cause.”105  
In other words, for a natural disaster to be successfully employed as in the 
‘Act of God’ defense, the natural disaster should not only be a concurring or 
contributing cause, but more importantly should also be the superseding 
cause.106 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Charvoz v. Bonneville Irrigation 
Dist. attempted to make a distinction between the terms “sole cause” and 
“primary cause.”107  According to the Charvoz court, primary cause refers to 
a plural condition, in which there are multiple causes; while sole cause refers 
to a single condition, in which there is only one cause, no other cause.108  
This is reaffirmed in United States v. West of England Ship Owner’s Mutual 
Protection & Indemnity Ass’n, where the court interpreted the term “sole 
cause” to mean: single, alone, and without an associate cause.109 
It becomes clear, thus, that in order for a natural event to be accepted as a 
defense to escape from liability, the event must be the sole cause of the 
incurred losses.  Consequently, whenever the court observes another cause in 
the forms of negligence or human intervention, the Act of God defense is 
very likely to be rejected.  It seems, hence, that from a legal perspective, 
there is a clear dividing line between a natural cause and human cause, 
enabling an Act of God and human negligence or act to cancel each other 
out.  This is clearly found in the ruling of Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, where 
the court was of the opinion that “[i]n order for the rule to apply, the ‘Act of 
God’ must be the sole cause of the injury.  There can be no combination of 
an act of God and the fault of man as the presence of one excludes the 
other.”110 
                                                                                                                   
 105 216 S.W.2d 756, 762 (Mo. 1948) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); accord Ark. Valley 
Elec. Coop. v. Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ark. 1990); Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. 
Supp. 2d 642, 658 (E.D. La. 2002); Dickman v. Truck Transport, Inc., 224 N.W.2d 459, 465 
(Iowa 1974); Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Ark. 1977); Joseph Resnick, Co. v. Kaisha, 
241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963). 
 106 See Wolff v. Light, 156 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D. 1968) (holding that “[i]t must be more 
than a mere concurrent and contributing cause; it must be a responsible cause or a superseding 
cause, that is, one which has superseded that original act or been itself responsible for the 
injury”); see also S. Pac. Co. v. City of L.A., 55 P.2d 847 (holding that a rainstorm of unusual 
intensity does not supersede the original negligence as proximate cause of an injury).  
 107 235 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1951). 
 108 Id. 
 109 872 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 110 475 P.2d 301, 304 (Wyo. 1970) (emphasis added). 
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Although in several cases there are attempts to humanize an Act of God 
whenever there is a comingling between an Act of God and a human act, by 
which the tortfeasor will be held liable despite the Act of God, one may 
nevertheless still argue for an apportionment of liability and compensation 
according to the contribution of the human act or negligence to the incurred 
losses.  A question thus arises as to which party bears the burden of proof 
with respect to the apportionment of liability.  In several cases, the courts 
held that the party who seeks for an Act of God bears the burden to show the 
extent of his or her contribution to the incurred losses.  In these cases, 
apportionment is thus directly linked to human contribution to an accident.  
If the party fails to prove his or her contribution to the damage, i.e., the 
percentage of the negligence or actions to the incurred losses, the party will 
be held liable for all consequences or losses.111  On this ground, Rundall 
infers that courts are rather hesitant to apportion liability based on the 
relative contribution of fault or human act to the incurred losses as compared 
to the contribution of an Act of God.112  The courts’ point of view has thus 
made it difficult for the tortfeasor to ask for an apportionment of liability.  
Accordingly, one may argue that the courts are actually quite consistent with 
the requirement that an Act of God should be the sole cause of the incurred 
losses, by which the tortfeasor will be held liable for the whole incurred 
losses whenever the courts find that the tortfeasor’s negligence or act 
contributes to the emergence of the losses. 
IV.  NATURAL DISASTERS AND NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 
This section uses nuclear liability law as an example to show whether a 
natural disaster can be used as a defense to exclude liability.  A nuclear 
accident may be caused by a combination of natural and man-made factors.  
The Fukushima Accident, which happened in Japan in 2011, is an example 
of this.  The Great East Japan earthquake that shook the east coast of Japan 
and the consequent tsunami were the direct triggers of the accident.  
However, a detailed analysis shows that many man-made factors contributed 
to the tragedy as well.113  The power plant, located on the east coast of Japan, 
                                                                                                                   
 111 United States v. Alcan Alumunium Corp., 892 F. Supp. 648, 657 (M.D. Pa. 1995); see 
also Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 765, 770 (N.M. 1938) (stating that appellant 
assumed a heavy burden of showing that the defendant was not negligent and thus did not 
contribute to cause the damage). 
 112 Rundall, supra note 33, at 761. 
 113 We will come back to the Fukushima accident below in Part V.B. 
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is very vulnerable to tsunami risks, and raises questions about the operator’s 
location decision.  Moreover, the design of the power plant was not flood-
resistant; all the emergency battery and electricity facilities were located at 
the turbining buildings, which were immediately flooded when the tsunami 
arrived.  Hence, the question arises whether the tsunami can be regarded as a 
valid defense to protect the operator from liability.  This, of course, is not 
only a specific concern of Japan as nuclear accidents can be catastrophic and 
can have a broad, transnational impact.  As such, it is helpful to examine 
international regimes dealing with nuclear accidents and the extent to which 
they consider a natural disaster to be a defense for nuclear liability.  
Many Western countries started to develop the nuclear industry to meet 
their increasing energy needs since the 1950s.  However, a few barriers to the 
development existed, like the serious public concern about sufficient 
protection against potential damage, and the hesitation of investors to step 
into such a high risk industry.114  To guarantee a certain level of 
compensation for potential victims, relieve the nuclear investors from the 
potential heavy claims, and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the 
governments tried to establish domestic nuclear liability acts and 
international conventions on nuclear liability.  
This Article will first address the so-called first generation conventions 
that emerged in the 1960s in subpart A and then look at some post-Chernobyl 
developments in subpart B.  The United States is not a member of the 
international regime but developed its own nuclear liability and 
compensation regime through the Price-Anderson Act of 1957.115  These 
nuclear liability rules and how the Act of God defense is treated in the 
United States will be examined in subpart C.  
A.  The First Generation Conventions 
In the 1960s, two international compensation regimes were established 
for nuclear damage: the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) regime. The July 29, 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
                                                                                                                   
 114 Julia A. Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to 
Chernobyl, in INT’L NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD 37, 38–39 (2006). 
 115 Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson Act), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 
71 Stat. 576 (1957). 
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Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention)116 and the January 31, 1963 
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention) were 
developed under the auspices of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 
(NEA).117  The second regime, the May 21, 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna Convention), was developed 
under the aegis of the IAEA.118  These two regimes are usually referred to as 
the first generation of nuclear liability conventions.119  
Since the Paris Convention and the Brussels Convention are established 
under the auspices of the OECD and NEA, they are regionally confined to 
Western Europe, Slovenia and Turkey.  The Vienna Convention, under the 
aegis of the IAEA is worldwide in scope.  These two regimes have some 
similar characteristics, such as strict liability, an exclusive channeling of 
liability to nuclear operators, a limitation of the liability in amount and in 
time, and compulsory financial security.120 
In Western Europe, there is a long-established tradition of a presumption 
of liability for hazards resulting from a dangerous activity.  The nuclear 
industry covered under the Paris Convention is obviously qualified as a 
dangerous activity and there is a serious difficulty in proving negligence of 
nuclear operators.  Therefore, a system of absolute liability is established 
under the Paris Convention.121  According to the Paris Convention, the 
operator is liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident in a nuclear 
installation or involving nuclear substances coming from such 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 
U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 117 Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field 
of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358. 
 118 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 
358 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 119 See Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A 
Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 229, 240 (2008). 
 120 For more detailed discussion of these legal doctrines in international nuclear liability 
conventions, see Norbert Pelzer, Focus on the Future of Nuclear Liability Law, 17 ENERGY & 
NAT. RES. L. 332, 334–341 (1999); Tom Vanden Borre, Nuclear Liability: An Anachronism in 
EU Energy Policy?, in EUROPEAN ENERGY LAW REPORT, at VII, 184, 198 (Martha M. 
Roggenkamp & Ulf Hammer eds., 2010). 
 121 Nuclear Energy Agency, Exposé des Motifs, Revised Text of the Exposé des Motifs of 
the Paris Convention, approved by the OECD Council on the 16th November 1982, ¶ 14 
[hereinafter Exposé des Motifs], available at https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_motif. 
html (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
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installations.122  To prove the fault of nuclear operators it is no longer 
necessary to establish liability.  The liability established under the Paris 
Convention is quite stringent and is referred to as absolute liability since 
many classic exonerations, such as force majeure, Acts of God, or 
intervening acts of third persons, under general tort law are no longer 
applicable.123  The available exonerations are an act of armed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war, and insurrection.124  Those disturbances are either of an 
international or of a political nature, so that they are regarded as “the 
responsibility of the nation.”125  The operator is not liable for damage caused 
via a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character unless the legislation 
of the contracting party in whose territory his nuclear installation is situated 
provides to the contrary.126  This defense was considered justified by the 
drafters since this type of disaster is catastrophic and completely 
unforeseeable.  Thus, it should fall into the responsibility of the nation as a 
whole rather than within the scope of the operator’s individual liability.127  
Similar stipulations about absolute liability and exonerations can also be 
found under the Vienna Convention.128  However, under the Vienna 
Convention, there is an additional possibility for the operator to be relieved 
of his liability: a competent court can, according to the applicable law, 
relieve the operator wholly or partly from his obligation if the operator can 
prove that damage resulted from gross negligence or an act or omission of 
the victims.129  
The negotiations of the Vienna Convention show that the adoption of 
grave natural disaster as an optional exoneration was not without debate.  
During the International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
(when the Vienna Convention was created), a few delegates, such as the 
United States and Philippines, proposed to delete “a grave natural disaster of 
an exceptional character” as a defense.130  Various delegates proposed doing 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Paris Convention, supra note 116, art. III(a). 
 123 Exposé des Motifs, supra note 121, ¶ 48. 
 124 Paris Convention, supra note 116, art. IX. 
 125 Exposé des Motifs, supra note 121, ¶ 48. 
 126 Paris Convention, supra note 116, art. IX.  
 127 Exposé des Motifs, supra note 121, ¶ 48. 
 128 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, arts. I(1)(K), IV(1)(3). 
 129 Id. art. IV(2). 
 130 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Official Records of the International 
Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Apr. 29–May 19, 1963), at 247–48 
[hereinafter IAEA Records], available at http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionS 
tore/_Public/42/080/43080878.pdf. 
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away with the exoneration of liability in the case of a natural disaster arguing 
that the draft convention accepted absolute liability as a result of which 
exonerations should be defined as narrowly as possible.131  Serious nuclear 
damage was also considered to be most likely caused by natural disasters and 
the more dangerous an undertaking was, the more the possibilities of 
exoneration should be reduced.132  It was also stressed that the risks should 
be borne by the party who created them and that the nuclear operator had 
greater capacity to prevent the damage than the public.133  
However, delegates from many countries held that the defense of natural 
disaster should be retained and that the use of this defense should depend on 
the installation states.  Japan, like the United States, played an active role 
during the negotiation procedure but, did not join the Vienna Convention in 
the end. In the discussion concerning the article related to exonerations, 
Japan argued that it is very vulnerable to natural disasters.  However, those 
risks were usually excluded from liability insurance policies.  As a result, 
holding nuclear operators liable in such cases would leave them uncovered 
by financial security.  Thus, Japan argued that whether grave natural 
disasters could exonerate operators from liability should be subject to the law 
of installation states.134  Additionally, it was agreed that natural disasters 
were not man-made, but were of the same nature as wars in terms that the 
operators are not in charge of them.  Hence, it was argued that war and 
natural disasters should be treated equally as exonerations.135  Moreover, it 
was argued that to cover natural risks under insurance, if possible at all, is 
very expensive and the states don’t want to overburden their nuclear 
industry.136  After two days of debate, Japan’s proposal was accepted: act of 
armed conflict, hostilities, and civil war or insurrection were adopted as 
exonerations, and a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character was 
kept only as a defense if the law of the installation state provides no 
contradictory provisions. 
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B.  New Developments 
The first generation of nuclear liability conventions have made an effort 
to establish international and regional regimes for nuclear liability.  
However, they have obvious limitations in terms of restricted geographical, 
scope narrow definitions of nuclear damage, and insufficient amount of 
available compensation.137  The Chernobyl accident in 1986 has triggered an 
intensive discussion about those limitations and led to the later revision 
process of the existing regimes.138  The so-called second generation of 
nuclear liability conventions were established thereafter.  Those conventions 
consist of the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention (Joint Protocol),139 the Protocol to 
Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
(the Protocol to the Vienna Convention),140 the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC),141 the Protocol to 
amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy of 29 July 1960 (the Protocol to the Paris Convention)142 and the 
Protocol to amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 supplementary to the 
Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy (the Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention).143  
Under the regimes of both NEA and IAEA, a few important changes have 
been made, especially the broadened scope of nuclear damage and the 
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 140 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
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 141 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature 
Sept. 29, 1997. 
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of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol 
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decreased amount of the limitation of liability. For example, under the 
Protocol to the Paris Convention, in addition to personal injury and property 
damage, parts of pure environmental damage are also compensable.144  The 
scope of liability in time and in amount is also increased.145  
As far as the defenses to nuclear liability are concerned, they are further 
limited in the second generation of nuclear liability conventions: the natural 
disasters are no longer an applicable defense.  The only still available 
defenses are that the nuclear incident is caused directly by armed conflict, 
hostilities, civil war or insurrection.146  It is worth noting that terrorism 
increasingly became a concern since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center in 2001, also in the field of nuclear damage coverage.147  
However, until now, terrorism per se was not a cause of exoneration under 
IAEA or OECD regimes.  Whether damage caused by terrorism can 
exonerate the nuclear operators depends on whether such an act rises to the 
level of “armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection.”148  There is 
some discord with the wording of these exonerations: it is argued that both 
“civil war” and “insurrection” can be included in the term “armed conflict” 
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according to international humanitarian law.  Besides, the word “hostilities” 
is considered to be too ambiguous.149 
The further limitation of the defenses is in line with the trend of providing 
more protection to victims in the revisions of nuclear liability conventions.  
Since, as Fukushima showed, nuclear facilities may not be able to resist 
grave natural disasters, allowing such defenses may deprive the victims of 
compensation.150  The explanatory text of the Protocol to Vienna Convention 
clarifies the reasons for the abrogation of the national disaster defense.  The 
nuclear installations are supposed to be built and maintained to withstand 
grave natural disasters, including even the ones of an exceptional 
character.151  
C.  Nuclear Liability and Act of God Defense in the U.S. 
As mentioned earlier, the United States is not a member of the 
international conventions. Therefore, how nuclear liability is arranged and 
whether Act of God is an available defense in the United States requires 
examination of United States law separately from the international 
conventions. 
In the 1950s the United States started to move towards peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and to allow private participation in nuclear power.152  The 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 allowed for the first time private possession of 
nuclear fuel.153  However, private investment lagged because of the 
unpredictability of potential liability and the unwillingness of the private 
insurance industry to provide sufficient coverage.154  Therefore, the Price-
Anderson Act of 1957 (the PAA) was enacted to provide nuclear liability 
rules and a system of financial responsibility.155  The PAA has a dual-
purpose: “to protect the public and to encourage the development of the 
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atomic energy industry.”156  The dual purpose can be seen in the provisions 
about limitation of liability and financial protection provided by the 
government.   
To ease the concerns of investors, the PAA exempts the licensees and 
contractors from unlimited liability.157  It adopts a limitation on aggregate 
public liability for a single nuclear incident.  The nuclear operators are asked 
to seek primary financial protection up to a maximum amount available from 
private sources ($60 million when the PAA was passed), including private 
liability insurance and self-insurance.158  The operators were mandated to 
further purchase $500 million from a government indemnification policy.159  
The liability was then capped at $560 million.160 This structure creates an 
economic channeling of liability.161  It required the nuclear operators to seek 
financial protection and hence exposed the major burden of compensation to 
the operators.  The other parties who may contribute to the risks, such as 
nuclear suppliers or designers can also be held liable.  Therefore, a legal 
channeling of liability as in the international regime does not exist under the 
PAA.  
An important shift happened in 1975 when the operators were asked to 
bear the financial burden themselves instead of getting support via 
government indemnity.162  Though the total amount of compensation was 
kept the same as that in 1957, a new tier of compensation, the retrospective 
premium, was introduced in place of the indemnity provided by the 
government.  All operators should pay the retrospective premiums in the case 
of an incident in excess of the primary liability coverage up to the amount of 
$5 million.163  The amount of primary financial protection and retrospective 
premiums has been increased over the years.  Now, the primary financial 
protection was set as $375 million, and the retrospective premium for each 
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operator from each incident should not exceed $121,255,000 per reactor per 
accident plus 5% for legal expenses since September 10, 2013.164  Given the 
current number of operating reactors, the maximum compensation for a 
nuclear incident is up to $13.6 billion. 
When the PAA was passed in 1957, it tried to keep tort law intact.  At that 
moment, suits for damages were brought under the state law where the 
nuclear accident occurred.165  From 1957 until 1966 when the PAA was 
renewed, there was no assurance that strict liability would be imposed in all 
states.166  There were some jurisdictions which purported to reject the 
doctrine of strict liability and a sizable number of others where the law 
relative to strict liability was unsettled.167  Negligence rules were, however, 
considered insufficient to provide protection for the public, given the 
difficulties to prove the negligence.168  The short statute of limitation under 
state law may also bar the victims from compensation as the damage may not 
manifest itself until many years after the accident.169  Considering the 
insufficiencies of the state law, Congress proposed to establish a federal rule 
of strict liability for the claims under the PAA.  The nuclear industry 
opposed a federal strict liability rule believing that such a rule would inhibit 
the development of nuclear power and make the public apprehensive.170  
Such a federal rule was regarded as contradictory to the principle of keeping 
interference with state law at a minimum.171 Therefore, it was rejected.172  
Instead, in the 1966 PAA, the nuclear industry waived certain defenses when 
the nuclear accident comprises an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” 
(ENO).173  The defenses included:  
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of 
persons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable 
or governmental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based 
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on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three 
years from the date on which the claimant first knew, or 
reasonably could have known, of his injury or damage and the 
cause thereof, but in no event more than twenty years after the 
date of the nuclear incident.  The waiver of any such issue or 
defense shall be effective regardless of whether such issue or 
defense may otherwise be deemed jurisdictional or relating to 
an element in the cause of action.174 
This provision also stipulates explicitly that certain defenses are not 
excluded, such as “a defense based upon a failure to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate damages” and “injury or damage to a claimant or to a claimant’s 
property which is intentionally sustained by the claimant or which results 
from a nuclear incident intentionally and wrongfully caused by the 
claimant.”175  It is worth noting that Act of God is not included in the waivers 
mentioned above.  Therefore, claims may still be possible even if an Act of 
God exists.176 
The above analysis shows that the waivers only apply in case of an ENO.  
Whether an accident comprises an ENO is determined by the NRC.  To be 
qualified as an ENO, a nuclear incident needs to satisfy the following 
criteria: the discharge or dispersal constitutes a substantial amount of source, 
special nuclear or byproduct material, or has caused substantial radiation 
levels offsite; and there have in fact been or will probably be substantial 
damages to persons offsite or property offsite.177  The NRC regulations give 
detailed criteria in determining whether the above mentioned conditions 
come due.178  The legislation restricts the waivers to ENOs for two reasons: 
to avoid “nuisance” suits and to protect the public from the consequences of 
catastrophic nuclear accidents.179  However, the substantial criteria are very 
difficult to satisfy.  Even the Three Mile Island accident was not classified as 
an ENO.180  After the Three Mile Island accident, revision of the criteria of 
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an ENO proposed to the NRC.181  The NRC also identified the difficulties in 
determining an ENO,182 and published three proposed amendments to the 
criteria in 1985 and solicited public comment on these amendments.183  Some 
scholars even advised the NRC to abolish the threshold of an ENO to allow 
better protection to victims.184  However, after the procedure of public 
comments on the proposed amendments, the NRC decided that the current 
criteria for determining an ENO were adequate and were consistent with the 
intent of Congress, and thus should be sustained.185  Under this situation, the 
majority of claims for nuclear damage may still not arise out of an ENO.186  
Therefore the question left is which type of liability rules will apply when 
an incident is not identified as an ENO.  One federal district court held that 
the PAA did not preempt state law in a “sub threshold” accident in Silkwood 
v. Kerr-McGee Corp.187  Therefore, whether strict liability would apply and 
which defenses were allowed was determined by the state law.  Recall that 
states varied in their attitudes toward strict liability in the 1960s.188 
A shift happened in 1988.  A sole and exclusive federal cause of action 
for any property damage or personal injury from radiation exposure, the 
Public Liability Action (PLA) was established in the 1988 Amendment 
Act.189  The term “Public liability action” is defined broadly to contain “any 
suit asserting public liability.”  The Price-Anderson Act also defines the 
related concepts “public liability” and “nuclear incident” broadly.190  
Through those broad definitions, Congress preempted all state causes of 
action.  There are two types of PLA causes of action: the cause of action for 
personal injury and that for property damage.191  As for the substantive rules 
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in deciding the action, they “shall be derived from the law of the State in 
which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent 
with the provisions of such section.”192 
The waivers of defenses still apply in case of ENOs.  Most waivers have 
not changed, except the statute of limitations requirement.193  However, 
important changes have happened for non-ENOs accidents.  Before 1988, 
claims from non-ENO accidents were filed as state law causes of action in 
state or federal courts.194  However, “[a]fter the Amendments Act, no state 
cause of action based upon public liability exists.  A claim growing out of 
any nuclear incident is compensable under the terms of the Amendments Act 
or it is not compensable at all.”195  As mentioned earlier, the federal courts 
can only derive decision rules from state law that are consistent with existing 
federal law.196  The federal law should be explained broadly as the “entire 
federal statutory scheme on nuclear power.”  The Amendments Act is simply 
the last addition to the federal law of nuclear energy that has been evolving 
since 1946 when Congress enacted the “Atomic Energy Act.”197  The PAA 
waived some defenses of fault in case of ENO.198  Some scholars deduced 
from it that the default situation of non-ENOs should allow the defense of 
not being at fault.199  In other words, the PLA cause of action in case of non-
ENO accidents should be a negligence case and a breach of a standard of 
care should be established.200  In many cases, the courts imposed a standard 
of care based on federal regulations governing permissible doses.201 
Nevertheless, there were some cases where compensation was awarded 
even though the nuclear operator was in compliance with federal regulatory 
standards.202  In Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., plaintiffs brought a 
nuisance and trespass action under Colorado law and sought compensatory 
and punitive damages.203  The District of Colorado awarded damages even 
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when the exposed dose remained far below the regulatory requirement.204  
Following Cook, the Western District of Washington applied strict liability in 
a non-ENO accident in In re Hanford Nuclear Reserving Litigation.205  
Those judgments were criticized by Jose and Garza for applying a wrong 
cause of action.206  Though Cook was not overruled, other counts have 
disagreed with its application.  For example, in Koller v. Pinnacle West 
Capital Corp., the court held that Cook failed to consider the preemption of a 
state law standard of care in light of the newly introduced federal PLA.207  It 
further concluded that “the standard of care in a negligence 
claim . . . asserted under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act, must be 
analyzed in the context of the federal regulatory safety standards.”208  
Applying strict liability for non-ENO cases is regarded as inconsistent with 
the Price-Anderson Act.209  Many courts have also declined to follow In re 
Hanford.210  Therefore, whether strict liability is applicable to non-ENO 
accidents, and whether breaching federal regulatory standards is necessary to 
determine a reasonable care standard, remains unsettled. 
As discussed earlier, substantive rules deciding nuclear liability cases can 
still deviate from state law as long as they are consistent with the PAA.  
Whether the Act of God defense plays a role in deciding nuclear liability has 
not been discussed in case law.  As discussed in Part III, there are many other 
negligence and strict liability cases where the Act of God defense can be 
made.  In other words, the Act of God defense may apply in both negligence 
and strict liability cases.  The difference lies in the content of the applicable 
tests, the “sole cause” element, and the foreseeability of the risk and impact. 
D.  Summary 
The Fukushima accident showed that a serious nuclear incident can be 
triggered by a natural disaster.  That triggers the question of whether such 
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natural disasters should limit or bar the liability of the nuclear operator.  
Interestingly, this question was, as we showed, already heavily debated 
during the meeting preceding the drafting of the Vienna Convention in the 
spring of 1963.211  In the original version of the international convention, an 
exoneration for damage caused via a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character was introduced, with the option for signatory states to abolish this 
exoneration.212  However, following the Chernobyl incident in 1986, the 
nuclear conventions were revised, and as a result of which the exoneration 
for natural disasters of an exceptional character was no longer available.213  
However, as we will show below, this exoneration still exists in the nuclear 
liability law of Japan, even though Japan is not a member to any of the 
international nuclear liability conventions.  When we look at the Act of God 
defense in U.S. law, the picture is more complicated.  The PAA waived 
several defences of fault if the harm arose from an ENO, but the Act of God 
is not among the waivers.214  Hence, applying Act of God defenses in case of 
ENO is still possible.  For harm from non-ENO accidents, the substantive 
rules of state law can still apply.215  Whether the Act of God defense is 
applicable in case of nuclear incidents has not been discussed in case law.  
The discussion in Part III shows that the Act of God defense is often allowed 
if the requirements of graveness, unforeseeability, and the Act of God being 
the sole cause are satisfied.  
Some reasons for rejecting nuclear disasters as grounds for exoneration of 
nuclear liability, as presented during the diplomatic debates in 1963, are 
economic.216  One argument is that the nuclear operator should be held liable 
when the damage caused by a natural disaster is foreseeable.  The risk of 
natural disasters such as flooding or earthquakes should be important in 
determining the location of the nuclear operator as well as in decisions 
concerning the optimal design.  Exposing nuclear operators to liability, even 
when the nuclear incident was triggered by a natural disaster is therefore 
certainly in line with the economic principles we have sketched above in Part 
II.  Liability in this particular case can still positively affect the operators’ 
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decision making process and therefore make sense from an economic 
perspective.  
V.  CASES 
The extent to which a natural disaster creates a following incident beyond 
the operator’s scope of control will often depend upon the factual situation.  
Therefore, we will now present two more detailed case studies.  One is the 
Fukushima case in Japan.  We start, however, with an Indonesian case which 
shows the difficulties in determining the man-made or natural character of a 
disaster and the blurring boundaries between those two categories.  
A.  Lapindo Mudflow Case: A Critical Perspective 
The mudflow occurred on May 29, 2006, when a mix of hot steam, water, 
and mud erupted in the middle of a rice field in Sidoarjo, East Java, 
Indonesia.217  This eruption occurred around 150 meters from an oil-drilling 
well, operated under a joint venture between two Indonesian oil companies,  
Lapindo Brantas and Medco, and an Australian company named Santos.218  
Currently, more than 130,000 cubic meters of hot mud erupts each day, 
creating a mudflow that inundates village after village forcing thousands to 
leave the area.219  Even seven years later, the mudflow has no sign of 
ceasing, and the number of victims keeps growing.220  
Lapindo, the largest shareholder of the drilling operation, is accused of 
triggering the mudflow, and Lapindo denies the relationship between the 
mudflow and its drilling operation.221  However, a report from the Indonesian 
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Supreme Audit Board showed several anomalies in the drilling operation, 
like the inappropriateness of Lapindo’s drilling operation location,222 the 
government’s lack of proper inspection to the drilling operation,223 and the 
inexperience of the operator.224  
Lapindo’s drilling operation was intended to search for gas reserves 
located at the Kujung limestone formation at a depth of around 10,000 feet.  
On March 8, 2006 Lapindo started to drill its BJP-1 drill well, and on May 
27, 2006 the drilling operation reached 9,297 feet.  On the same day, an 
earthquake of a magnitude of 6.3 on the Richter Scale hit Yogyakarta, which 
is around 280 kilometers southwest from Sidoarjo.225  It was reported that at 
9,297 feet the drilling underwent total loss circulation, forcing the operator to 
pull out the drill pipe and bit.  It was during the process of pulling out the 
drill pipe that on May 28, 2006, the phenomenon known as “kick” (an influx 
of pore fluid into the well bore) occurred at 4,241 feet, causing the drill to get 
stuck.226  The following day, a stream of volcanic mud started to erupt at 
around 150 meters away from the drill-well.  Because the mudflow 
inundated the drilling area, the operator decided to abandon the well 
temporarily on June 4, 2006, and permanently on August 1, 2006.227 
From such a series of events, an important question arises about the 
possible cause of the mudflow.  The Supreme Audit Board observed three 
different possible scenarios.  The first one is that the mudflow was triggered 
by the underground blowout, where fluids from two different zones influx 
into the surface.  The report shows that this view was also initially shared by 
Lapindo.228  The second scenario is that the mudflow stems from a mud 
                                                                                                                   
Calamity: A Man-Made Mud Bath, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
10/06/world/asia/06mud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 222 KEUANGAN, supra note 218, at 29.  In addition, the report also criticizes the fact that the 
drilling took place in a highly populated area.  As observed by the Board’s report, the location 
of the driling operation was only five meters away from a residential area, and less than 100 
meters away from public facilities. Id. at 27–28. 
 223 Lapindo never submitted its daily drilling report to the BP Migas, a state agency that 
regulated and controlled oil and gas mining in Indonesia, and the agency never imposed a 
sanction on the company for its failure to report its drilling operation.  Id. at 50–51. 
 224 The report shows that Lapindo has contracted a drilling company named PT. Medici 
Citra Nusa (MCN) to conduct the drilling.  According to the report, PT. MCN had conducted 
only one drilling operation before it was involved as Lapindo’s contractor.  Id. at 31–32. 
 225 Cyranoski, supra note 217. 
 226 Id. 
 227 KEUANGAN, supra note 218, at 32. 
 228 The Supreme Audit Board refers to a report from Lapindo on June 8, 2006 agreeing that 
the mudflow was caused by an underground blowout, where fluids from two different zones, 
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volcano that was triggered by Lapindo’s drilling activities.  This scenario 
would place blame on Lapindo’s drilling activities and Lapindo’s negligence 
for not installing a steel casing for a part of the drill hole.229  Under the third 
scenario, the mudflow is considered to have no relationship with the drilling 
operation, since it was caused by a mud volcano as a result of the Yogyakarta 
earthquake.  If this were the case, the earthquake created a new underground 
fraction that enabled the mud to flow to the surface.230  
Under the first and second scenarios, the mudflow to a large extent 
corresponds to Lapindo’s drilling operation, while the third scenario rejects 
the connection between the drilling operation and the mudflow.231  
Furthermore, it could also be assumed that under the first and second 
scenarios, the mudflow would not have occurred without the drilling 
operation, while under the third scenario, the mudlow would have occurred 
even if the drilling operation did not exist. 
The local residents have suffered most of the resulting losses including 
over 3.2 trillion IDR (U.S. $296 million) in lost property.  Economic losses, 
in terms of property and income losses, were also incurred by private 
companies (around 377 billion IDR; U.S. $34.8 million), several state-owned 
companies (around 57 billion IDR; U.S. $5.27 million), and a local water 
company (around 171 million IDR; U.S. $15,800).  In addition, efforts to 
stop and control the mudflow in 2007 cost almost 1.5 trillion IDR 
(approximately U.S. $138.8 million).  Total losses and expenses had reached 
5.1 trillion IDR (more than U.S. $560 million) in 2007.232  These figures are 
very likely to increase as a report by the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional (Bappenas), the National Development Planning Agency, projects 
that by the year 2015 the mudflow could affect an area of 580 square 
kilometers or 80% of Sidoarjo Regency, and result in total economic losses 
of 16.4 trillion IDR (more than U.S. $1.8 billion).233 
Since the begining of the eruption, Lapindo and its drilling operation have 
been accused of causing the mudflow.234 Accordingly, the company was 
                                                                                                                   
the overpressure zone and the Kujung formation, influxed into the surface through the existing 
fault.  See id. at 33. 
 229 Id. at 34. 
 230 Id. at 35. 
 231 Id. at 64–65. 
 232 Id. at 274–77. 
 233 Padjar Iswara et al., Janji Baru Pemilik Lapindo, TEMPO, Dec. 8, 2008, at 100.  
 234 For example, one could refer to the opinion of Amin Widodo, a geologist from Surabaya 
Institute of Technology, in an interview with Tempo magazine.  The scholar noted Lapindo’s 
negligence in causing the mudflow.  See Untung Widyanto et al., Alarm Bells, TEMPO ENGLISH, 
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asked to compensate for the damage resulting from the mudflow.  
Understandably, Lapindo has dismissed the accusation, and consequently 
claimed that any payment to the victims is only part of the company’s social 
solidarity, not a legal duty.235  Lapindo also insists that the payment for the 
victims take place under the framework of sale and purchase of property title, 
not under any compensation scheme.  Thus, it seems any compensation will 
imply that Lapindo is liable for causing the mudflow.236 
The mudflow has placed the Indonesian Government in a predicament.  
Politically, the President is under pressure from victims and NGOs on one 
side, and from Lapindo on the other side.237  The Government tries both to 
help the victims of the mudflow and to avoid harming Lapindo.238 
1.  Court Ruling on the Mudflow Disaster 
In 2007, a lawsuit was brought by Walhi, an Indonesian environmental 
NGO, against the Indonesian Government and drilling companies, including 
Lapindo.  In this case, the plaintiff sought to hold defendants liable for 
environmental damage resulting from the Sidoarjo Mudflow.  The plaintiff 
asked the defendants to stop the mudflow, as well as recover and rehabilitate 
the affected areas.239  This section will discuss not only the ruling of Walhi v. 
                                                                                                                   
Aug. 22, 2006, http://magz.tempo.co/konten/2006/08/22/LU/13412/Alarm-Bells/51/06 (last 
visited on Mar. 13, 2015).  
 235 KEUANGAN, supra note 218, at 192. 
 236 In 2007 and 2008, Lapindo published several advertorials for several days in major 
national newspapers.  The advertorials basically argued that the mudflow was caused by a 
natural phenomenon, i.e., the mud volcano created by the Yogyakarta earthquake.  For 
discussions about these advertorials, see Wenseslaus Manggut et al., Aneka Cara Menyemir 
Lapindo, TEMPO, Feb. 30, 2008. 
 237 In this regard, it is important to note that Aburizal Bakrie, who is one of the richest men 
in Indonesia and served as the Coordinating Minister of Social Welfare when the first mud 
eruption took place, owns the majority of Lapindo shares.  He is the current Chairman of the 
Golkar Party, Indonesia’s second largest party that forms a coalition with the President’s 
Democratic Party and some other parties.  See Raymond Bonner & Muktita Suhartono, New 
Indonesia Calamity: A Man-Made Mud Bath, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2006/10/06/world/asia/06mud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Simon Montlake, Volcano 
Reveals A Murky Indonesia, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan/Feb 2008, at 19; see also Java’s 
Unstoppable Mudflow: Slimy Business, ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 2007, at 58, available at http:// 
www.economist.com/node/10225951. 
 238 Dani Muhtada, Ethics, Economics and Environmental Complexity: The Mud Flow 
Disaster in East Java, 25 SYS. RES. & BEHAV. SCI. 181, 186 (2008). 
 239 Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 284/Pdt.G/2007/PN.Jak.Sel 21 (South Jakarta D. Ct. 
2007).  
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Lapindo, but will also analyze and criticize the ruling by comparing the 
doctrines of strict liability and the Act of God defense discussed in previous 
sections.  
  a.  Introduction to Walhi v. Lapindo 
In Walhi v. Lapindo, the plaintiff claimed that the mudflow resulted from 
negligence of the drilling companies.  According to the plaintiff, the drilling 
companies’ negligence can be seen in the form of the failures to implement 
good practices in the drilling operation, to notice the sensitivity of the 
drilling location, and to take precautionary measures although the drilling 
operation was conducted in a highly populated area.240  In addition, the 
plaintiff argued that the drilling activity was not supported by an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA).  In the plaintiff’s view, as a 
consequence of the absence of the EIA document, there was no proper 
anticipation of possible adverse impacts according to good engineering 
practices.241  Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the drilling operation 
was conducted without installment of a drill pipe casing.  According to the 
plaintiff, the absence of the drill pipe casing constituted a violation of a duty 
of care according to the good practices in drilling operation.242  The plaintiff 
also asked that the drilling companies be held liable on the ground of strict 
liability.  Strict liability refers to Article 35 of the 1997 EMA, while the 
negligence rule refers to Article 34 of the EMA.243 
                                                                                                                   
 240 Id. at 10. 
 241 Id.  
 242 Id. at 126.    
 243 Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 23 of 1997 regarding Environmental Management 
has been repealed by Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management. An 
English copy can be found at http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?database=faolex&sea 
rch_type=query&table=result&query=LEX-FAOC013056&format_name=@ERALL&lang=e 
ng (“Article 34 (1) Every action which infringes the law in the form of environmental pollu-
tion and/or damage which gives rise to adverse impacts on other people or the environment, 
obliges the party responsible for the business and/or activity concerned to pay compensation 
and/or to carry out certain actions.  Article 35 (1) The party responsible for a business and/or 
activity which gives rise to a large impact on the environment, which uses hazardous and toxic 
materials and/or produces hazardous and toxic waste, is strictly liable for losses which are 
given rise to, with the obligation to pay compensation directly and immediately upon the 
occurrence of environmental pollution and/or damage.”); Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 
383/Pdt/2008/PT.DK 8 (Jakarta Ct. App. 2008).  It is unclear why the plaintiff used the two 
liability rules simultaneously.  Indeed, the way the plaintiff mixed the negligence rule with 
strict liability has made its claim unnecessarily obscure.  For instance, although the plaintiff 
has used both the negligence rule and strict liability, the evidence and arguments provided by 
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In response to these charges, Lapindo stated that strict liability could not 
be applied in the case since the drilling operation it carried out did not use 
hazardous substances or produce hazardous wastes.244  Lapindo’s argument 
relied on Article 35 part one of the 1997 EMA which states that strict 
liability is applicable to activities using hazardous substances, producing 
hazardous wastes, and/or giving rise to major or significant impacts on the 
environment.245  One may certainly argue that the drilling operation could 
result in major or significant impacts on the environment, and hence, meet 
the requirements set forth in the 1997 EMA.  However, in Lapindo’s point of 
view, for strict liability to be applicable, the requirements above should be 
interpreted cumulatively such that the plaintiff should prove that Lapindo’s 
drilling activity has, at the same time, used hazardous substances, produced 
hazardous wastes, and caused serious damage to the environment. 
Furthermore, Lapindo also denied it has carried out an unlawful act.  In 
this context, Lapindo argued that the absence of the EIA document does not 
constitute an unlawful act since the drilling activity, which was still in the 
exploration stage, was not an activity that requires the EIA documents.246  In 
addition, Lapindo challenged the claim of unlawfulness by indicating that the 
drilling activity has met all requirements, permits, and procedures.247  
Through its expert witnesses, Lapindo argued that the absence of drill pipe 
casing does not prove the company’s fault negligence.248  Importantly, 
Lapindo’s expert witnesses argued that the mudflow occurred as a result of a 
tectonic earthquake that hit Yogyakarta, around 300 km from the drilling 
site, two days prior to the first mud eruption.249  
The District Court of South Jakarta ruled in favor of the defendants on the 
ground that the mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon, i.e., the 
Yogyakarta earthquake.  Hence, all defendants were acquitted from liability.  
The court further held that the government and Lapindo have a moral 
                                                                                                                   
the plaintiff only attempted to show the defendants’ negligence.  It becomes even more 
ambiguous when one looks at the statements of claim in which the plaintiff, despite the use of 
strict liability, still asks the court to hold that the defendants have conducted an unlawful act 
resulting in environmental damage in three districts in Sidoarjo. Id. at 21. 
 244 Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 383/Pdt/2008/PT.DK 47 (Jakarta Ct. App. 2008).   
 245 See generally id.  
 246 Id. at 45–46.  Indeed, the exploration of oil and gas is excluded from the list of activities 
that require an EIA according to the Regulation of the Minister of the Environment No. 11 of 
2006. 
 247 Id. at 36.  
 248 Id. at 195.  
 249 Id. at 48, 153–63, 195. 
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obligation to take measures to restore the damage, stop the mudflow, and 
address social problems resulting from the mudflow.  However, the court 
implicitly took the position that the government and Lapindo had met their 
moral obligations.  In fact, the court considered the government’s and 
Lapindo’s efforts to handle the mudflow to be sufficient.250   
The plaintiffs then brought the case to the Jakarta Court of Appeals, 
which upheld the lower court’s decision.251  The case did not advance past 
the Court of Appeals because the plaintiffs failed to submit the case to the 
Supreme Court.  
The District Court of South Jakarta was of the opinion that both the 
government and Lapindo have sufficiently addressed the mudflow and its 
resulting damage.  The court’s position might, to a large extent, be affected 
by the court’s view that the mudflow is the result of a natural disaster.  It is 
in this context that the court’s decision on Walhi v. Lapindo merits further 
discussions.   
b.  Court’s Ruling: Earthquake Triggered the Mudflow 
Before reaching its conclusion, the court posed a question of “apakah 
keluarnya semburan lumpur panas tersebut disebabkan oleh kesalahan 
Tergugat I dalam pengeboran atau disebabkan oleh fenomena alam” 
[translation: whether the mudflow was caused by the First Defendant’s, i.e., 
Lapindo, negligence in conducting its drilling operation or by a natural 
phenomenon].252  To answer this question, the Court then turned to 
testimonies of expert witnesses provided by both the plaintiff and defendants.   
The only technical expert witness provided by the plaintiff stated that the 
mudflow was largely caused by the missing drill pipe casing.  The witness 
also argued that drill pipe casing is an obligation for every drilling operation.  
The casing functions as a safety precaution to prevent an accident during the 
operation.  Because the casing was not installed when the drilling reached 
9,270 feet in depth, the drilling well could not sustain the high pressure as a 
“kick” occurred.  This series of events eventually led to the explosion of hot 
                                                                                                                   
 250 Id. at 197.  It is not quite clear what the court means by moral obligations.  The court did 
not explain why the government and Lapindo should bear similar moral obligations.  Nor did 
the court explain why measures already taken by the government and Lapindo already are 
sufficient to meet such obligations.  
 251 See generally Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 383/Pdt/2008/PT.DK 29–30 (Jakarta Ct. 
App. 2008).  
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muddy water causing the mudflow.253  The witness also argued the fact that 
the muddy water has erupted a few hundred meters from the drilling well can 
be explained by combining two factors.  On one hand, the drilling well was 
blocked by drilling equipment.  On the other hand, there was an area of the 
drilling well where the casing was not installed.  In the witness’s view, the 
combination of these two factors led to the mud eruption, because the 
blocking of the drilling well has forced the water to find a way up through 
the area where the drill casing was absent, finally reaching the surface and 
bursting a few hundred meters from the well.254  
However, this opinion was challenged by the defendant’s four technical 
expert witnesses.  The first expert argued that the area where the drilling took 
place was prone to mud volcanoes.  The expert also stated that the occurring 
mud volcano has nothing to do with human activities, it is solely related to a 
natural event.  Hence, the expert witness also argued that the mudflow 
cannot be stopped.255  The second expert argued that the mudflow was 
triggered by ground motions as an extension of the Yogyakarta 
earthquake.256  The third expert agreed that the mudflow was caused by a 
mud volcano triggered by ground motions, which did not correspond to 
Lapindo’s drilling operation.257  The fourth expert stated that according to 
characteristics of the muddy water, the water comes from an area much 
deeper than the depth that the drilling had reached.  Hence, he argued that the 
drilling was not the cause of the mudflow.  The fourth expert also testified 
that an uninstalled drill casing was a common practice, and hence, was not a 
mistake.  There were drilling wells in other regions that had no such a casing 
installed without experiencing similar problems, despite the fact that those 
wells were much deeper than the well in question.258   
The experts provided by the defendant agreed that the mudflow was the 
result of a mud volcano, formed by ground motions that were triggered by 
the Yogyakarta earthquake taking place two days before the first mud 
eruption.  This conclusion was exactly the same as that held by the court.259  
The court also argued that the opinion of one expert provided by the plaintiff 
has been ruled out by the opinions of the four defense expert witnesses.  The 
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court concluded that the mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon, and 
not by the defendants’ negligence.260 
2.  Critical Notes on the Court’s Ruling in Walhi v. Lapindo 
As explained earlier, the court in Walhi v. Lapindo asked whether the 
mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon or by the fault of the 
defendant in conducting its drilling operation.  In concluding that the 
mudflow was caused by a natural phenomenon, the court did not actually 
focus on whether there was any negligence on the part of the defendants.  
Therefore, the court’s conclusion is vulnerable to criticism. 
First, the court seems to have mishandled the question of strict liability, 
failing to consider whether strict liability was applicable to the case.  Second, 
in failing to consider whether the defendant had any fault, it seems that the 
court decided that whenever there is an Act of God, the question of the 
defendants’ fault is no longer relevant.  This is unacceptable because there is 
no basis to release the defendants from liability without considering their 
contribution to the incurred losses. 
The court also moved too fast in concluding that the mudflow was caused 
by the Yogyakarta earthquake.  Reading the court’s consideration, one might 
get a strong impression that one of the reasons supporting its conclusion is 
the fact that there was only one expert witness who attributed the mudflow to 
the way in which Lapindo conducted its drilling operation, as compared to 
four expert witnesses arguing that the mudflow was caused by a natural 
phenomenon, i.e., the ground motions triggered by the Yogyakarta 
earthquake.261  Therefore, it seems that the conclusion was supported by the 
majority of scientists.  However, this is not the case.  Contrary to the court’s 
conclusion, a majority of the world’s leading geologists, during a 2008 
meeting in Cape Town, agreed on a shared belief that the mudflow was more 
likely to have been triggered by Lapindo’s drilling than by the Yogyakarta 
earthquake.262 
Furthermore, it is important to compare the ruling in the Walhi v Lapindo 
with some insights from the discussion on United States court rulings 
concerning the Act of God defense.  As explained earlier, U.S. courts usually 
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 261 See id.  
 262 Oil Company Blamed for Mud-Volcano Eruption, 456 NATURE 14 (Nov. 6, 2008), available 
at http://www.nature.com/news/2008/081105/full/4560146.html; see also Did Drilling Cause 
Eruption?, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 8, 2008, at 6. 
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employ several criteria when examining the Act of God defense.  Had the 
Indonesian court asked for evidence similar to that required by the U.S. 
courts, the result of the Walhi v. Lapindo case might have been significantly 
different.   
The discussions below show how the U.S. court requirements for the Act 
of God defense would be applied to the Walhi v. Lapindo.  In particular, the 
discussions below attempt to answer whether the Yogyakarta earthquake, as 
an event triggering the mud volcano that eventually leads to the Sidoarjo 
mudflow, was: first, grave in character; second, unforeseeable, unanticipated, 
and unpreventable; and third, the sole proximate cause, free from human 
negligence or intervention.   
In deciding whether the Act of God defense invoked by Lapindo is valid, 
a court should first evaluate whether the Yogyakarta earthquake was a grave 
natural disaster for the location of the Sidoarjo mudflow, as it occurred 300 
kilometers away from Yogyakarta.  Such a question means that one needs to 
look into the magnitude of the earthquake, felt in the location of the 
mudflow, in order to conclude if the earthquake was strong enough to trigger 
the mudflow.  In this context, one commentator states that the Yogyakarta 
earthquake was in fact too small and too far away to trigger a mud volcano. 
Specifically, based on data on earthquakes in the region, previous 
earthquakes have been observed that were larger and much closer to the 
location of the mudflow than the Yogyakarta earthquake.  However, those 
earthquakes did not trigger a mudflow.263  From this point of view, it might 
be concluded the Yogyakarta could not have triggered a mud volcano in 
Sidoarjo region as massive as the currently occurring mudflow.   
However, one might argue that the distance from the epicenter of the 
Yogyakarta earthquake and the location of the mudflow should not be an 
issue, because, according to a leading scientist, an earthquake is still able to 
trigger a mud volcano in a location thousands of kilometers away.264  In this 
regard, what matters is whether the Yogyakarta earthquake created a seismic 
energy that was capable of reactivating the already over-pressurized 
                                                                                                                   
 263 Michael Manga, Did an Earthquake Trigger the May 2006 Eruption of the Lusi Mud 
Volcano?, 88 EOS 201 (2007); see also Richard J. Davies et al., The East Java Mud Volcano 
(2006 to Present): An Earthquake or Drilling Trigger?, 272 EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 
LETTERS 627, 629–30 (2008); Michael Manga, Maria Brumm & Maxwell L. Rudolph, 
Earthquake Triggering of Mud Volcanoes, 26 MARINE & PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 1785, 1788 
(2009). 
 264 A. Mazzini, Triggering and Dynamic Evolution of the LUSI Mud Volcano, Indonesia, 
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underground fractures in the pre-existing fault zone underneath the location 
of the mudflow eruption, triggering the hot, muddy water eruption.  Hence, 
the issue is not about distance, but about the impacts of energy created by a 
seismic activity.  
To respond to this argument, one indeed needs to actually investigate and 
predict how great the energy created by the Yogyakarta earthquake was, such 
that it could trigger ground motions at the location of the mudflow eruption.  
In this regard, researchers have investigated static and dynamic stress 
changes caused by other earthquakes, by the Yogyakarta earthquake, and by 
the drilling work at the site of the mudflow eruption.265  The researchers 
observe that changes in pore pressure, due to changes in static and dynamic 
stresses caused by the earthquake, were negligible to lead to a mud volcano.  
In fact, tens of previous earthquakes, which had significantly larger ground 
motions than the Yogyakarta earthquake, did not yield enough stress to cause 
a mud volcano in the location of the present mudflow.266  A less technical 
interpretation of these findings is that the dynamic stress changes created by 
the Yogyakarta earthquake are similar to the stress changes generated from 
the force of an adult footstep, whereas the static stress changes are even 500 
times smaller.  In comparison, Lapindo’s nearby drilling generated drill-pipe 
pressures able to cause stress changes similar to the pressure generated by 
about ten to twenty elephants.267  Thus, the drilling is more likely than the 
earthquake to cause the mudflow.  Consequently, it could be argued that, felt 
at the mudflow location, the Yogyakarta earthquake was too small to be 
considered a grave natural disaster. 
Assume that all scientific opinions above were flawed.  Accordingly, the 
Yogyakarta earthquake could still be considered as capable of triggering a 
mud volcano.  If this was the case, Lapindo still has the burden to prove that 
the mudflow, as a form of mud volcano, was unforeseeable, and the impacts 
of it was unpreventable.  In this regard, the next question that should have 
                                                                                                                   
 265 According to the authors, earthquakes can expand or contract the Earth’s crust 
permanently.  These permanent stress changes, referred to as static stress changes, could cause 
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waves generated by earthquakes create temporary stress, referred to as dynamic stress 
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sediment flow as the conditions of a mud volcano formation.  See Davies et al., supra note 
263, at 630–31.  It could be argued that the larger the stress changes are, the more likely a 
mud volcano is to occur.   
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been addressed by the court is whether the mudflow, as a form of mud 
volcano, should have been foreseen and anticipated.   
Davies et al. consider that the Sidoarjo mudflow originated from an 
undersurface blowout.268  This opinion is challenged by Sawolo et al., who 
argue that even two months after the eruption the drilling bit was still in the 
original position, suggesting that the muddy water has never flown up the 
well,269 and more importantly, the drilling well and the casing shoe remained 
intact after the mudflow eruption, indicating that there is no connection 
between the drilling and the mudflow.270  In responding to this challenge, 
Davies et al. argue the facts that the well was still intact and the drill bit was 
still in its original position do not indicate that the blowout did not occur.  
According to Davies et al., the re-entry of the well does not indicate that the 
well remained intact.  In addition, they also argue that the drill bit can remain 
in its original position particularly in zones of highly swelling clays and if 
the large volumes of cement have been pumped into the wells, such as in the 
Lapindo’s drilling well case.  Hence, according to Davies et al., the facts 
submitted by Sawolo et al., do not prove that the mudflow was not caused by 
an undersurface blowout.271 
Davies et al.’s argument above will inevitably give rise to a serious legal 
consequence because if the mudflow was indeed caused by blowouts, then 
the Act of God defense will automatically be rejected.  This is because a 
blowout is considered a common phenomenon in drilling practices, which 
leads to the responsibility of those engaged in the drilling operation to 
foresee and anticipate.  This is very clearly stated in Green v. General 
Petroleum, in which the court rejected a defense arguing blowouts amounted 
to an Act of God.  There, the court held that since it is common knowledge 
that “the inner earth contains powerful gaseous forces, frequently found in 
proximity to and in connection with deposits of petroleum substances.”272  
For this reason, the court contended that the blowouts did not constitute an 
Act of God.273   
Moreover, the fact that the area where Lapindo’s drilling operation is 
located is prone to mud volcanism is admitted not only by the camp 
                                                                                                                   
 268 Davies et al., supra note 263, at 637.  
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attributing the mudflow to Lapindo’s drilling,274 but also by those who argue 
that the Sidoarjo mudflow is an earthquake-triggered mud volcano.  Sawolo 
et al., clearly state that the Sidoarjo mudflow “is a new mud volcano in a 
region prone to mud volcanism.  Along the vicinity of the Watukosek fault, 
where LUSI is situated, there are at least five other known mud 
volcanoes.”275  Similarly, even during the court hearing, an expert witness 
submitted by Lapindo argued that mud volcano is a common phenomenon in 
Sidoarjo region.276   
The fact that mud volcanism is a common and known phenomenon in the 
Lapindo’s drilling site should have had an impact on the court’s ruling.  
Because the drilling was carried out in a location prone to mud volcanism, 
the possibility of a mud volcano should have been foreseen and anticipated.  
In this context, the court should have investigated whether the design and 
operation of Lapindo’s drilling activities had foreseen and anticipated the 
possibility of mud volcanism.  The court should also have considered 
whether Lapindo had taken appropriate measures to mitigate the occurring 
mud volcano.  Unfortunately, these two legal consequences were overlooked 
in the court’s ruling.  Lessons from the U.S. courts show that common and 
known natural events, regardless of the magnitude, impose obligations on 
parties who carry out an activity to foresee and anticipate the events, and to 
take preventive measures accordingly.  Failure to foresee, anticipate, and 
prevent harm resulting from such common events means that the parties are 
negligent and leads to the rejection of the Act of God defense. 
However, if the court found that the mud volcano and the earthquake 
were unforeseeable, Lapindo still actually has the burden to prove that the 
mudflow was solely caused by the Yogyakarta earthquake.  In this regard, 
the last question that needs to be answered is whether the mudflow occurred 
independently of human intervention, either in the forms of negligence or 
human act, or in simpler words, whether the mudflow would still have 
occurred even if Lapindo did not conduct its drilling operation.   
As discussed earlier, the court in Walhi v. Lapindo overlooked the 
question of whether there was human intervention in the case.277  The court 
seems to be of the opinion that the presence of an Act of God could rule out 
                                                                                                                   
 274 See, e.g., Davies et al., supra note 263, at 1656.  
 275 Sawolo et al., supra note 269, at 1780 (emphasis added). 
 276 Walhi v. Lapindo Brantas, Inc., 284/Pdt.G/2007/PN.Jak.Sel 38.   
 277 This is because the court only focused on the question of whether the earthquake has 
triggered the mudflow,  and failed to consider the possible contribution of Lapindo’s drilling 
operation.  Id. at 193–96. 
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any man-made contributions.  Let us now examine the question of whether 
there was human intervention in the mudflow case, either in the forms of 
Lapindo’s negligence (in the case of the negligence rule) or Lapindo’s 
drilling operation (in the case of strict liability). 
One common reason to show Lapindo’s fault is the fact that there was an 
area of open hole, where the drill casing was not installed into the well.  
Rubiandini argues that the installment of drill casing is part of the standard 
operating procedure within the drilling practice.  He compares the casing 
with the helmet for a motor rider, where both function as a safety procedure 
to reduce risks.278 
Another factor that might cause the mudflow is the way the drilling 
operators have dealt with the blowout phenomenon.  In this regard, Bachtiar, 
as quoted by Cyranoski, stated that one of the possible causes of the 
mudflow was that the drill was removed too quickly when the blowout was 
happening, such that the pressure inside the well becomes uncontrollable.279  
To some extent, Davies et al. agree with this opinion.  They argue that the 
absence of the casing was only a contributing factor for the mud volcano.  
The main factor triggering the formation of mud volcano is the removal of 
the drill bit and drill pipe on May 27, 2006, the days when the “kicks” were 
occurring and where the hole was extremely unstable, which then caused an 
influx of formation fluid and gas into the wellbore.280   
In addition to these factors, Davies et al., also indicate two other critical 
errors in the way the drilling was operated.  Their errors are overestimating 
the ability of the well to sustain pressure and the failure to identify the “kick” 
more rapidly.281  Certainly, one could also add to these errors the possibility 
that Lapindo has failed to foresee, anticipate, and take necessary preventive 
measures against a common and known phenomenon of mud volcanism.  All 
of these factors should eventually lead to the conclusion that some 
negligence on the side of the defendant was present in the mudflow case. 
Even if one agrees with Mazzini et al.’s opinion that it is impossible to 
determine the cause of the mudflow with certainty, one cannot, however, 
entirely dismiss the presence of negligence in the drilling operation.  
Consequently, if the court applied the U.S. court’s criterion that the Act of 
                                                                                                                   
 278 Rudi Rubiandini, Interviu: Mereka Sudah Keterlaluan, VI(18) TRUST 56, 57 (2008).  It 
seems also that initially Davies thought that the absence of casing was a primary trigger of the 
mudflow.  See Davies et al., supra note 263, at 629.     
 279 Cyranoski, supra note 217, at 814. 
 280 Davies et al., supra note 263, at 637. 
 281 Sawolo et al., supra note 269.  
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God should be free from the defendant’s negligence, the court would have 
rejected the Act of God defense submitted by Lapindo.  
Let us now consider whether the mudflow would still have occurred even 
in the absence of Lapindo’s drilling.  One way to answer this question is to 
compare the impacts of the Yogyakarta earthquake and Lapindo’s drilling on 
the location of the mudflow eruption.  Recalling, Davies et al. comparison 
mentioned earlier, it is clear that compared to the earthquake, the drilling has 
created much larger and more powerful stress changes capable of increasing 
pore pressure, which could eventually lead to the eruption.  Again, the 
studies of Manga and also Davies et al., show that previously tens and even 
hundreds of earthquakes that were much larger and closer than the 
Yogyakarta earthquake did not cause a mud volcano at the same location.282  
Hence, if one considers that the conclusion solely attributing the mudflow 
to the drilling is inconclusive, one cannot nevertheless completely rule out 
the possibility that the drilling might have impacts on the mudflow.  In this 
regard, even Mazzini, a leading scientist arguing that the mudflow was 
triggered by the Yogyakarta earthquake, still admits the possibility that the 
drilling might have contributed to the mudflow.283   
These facts give rise to two possible consequences to the rulings of Walhi 
v. Lapindo.  First, the court should have rejected the Act of God defense on 
the ground that it is impossible to rule out the possibility of the drilling’s 
contribution to the mudflow, and hence, it cannot be proven that the 
Yogyakarta earthquake was the sole cause of the mudflow.  Second, the 
court could have found that there was a possibility of comingling between 
the earthquake and the drilling, and could have held Lapindo liable for all 
incurred losses due to its failure to make an apportionment regarding the 
contribution of the earthquake and Lapindo’s contributing acts to the 
incurred losses. 
In addition, if the court consistently applied strict liability in Walhi v. 
Lapindo, the court should have actually asked Lapindo to prove that the 
occurring mudflow does not fall within the risk of conducting a drilling 
operation, particularly in a mud volcano-prone area.  Alternatively, Lapindo 
should have actually been asked to show the impossibility of the mudflow 
resulting from the conducted drilling operation.   
                                                                                                                   
 282 See generally Manga, supra note 263; Davies et al., supra note 263.  
 283 Dennis Normille, Two Years On, a Mud Volcano Still Rages and Bewilders, 320 SCIENCE 
1406 (2008). 
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None of these issues were addressed by the court, leaving one with no 
other option than to conclude that the ruling on Walhi v. Lapindo is not only 
weak, but also inconsistent with the doctrines of strict liability and the Act of 
God defense. 
B.  Fukushima: Act of God? 
1.  The Factual Background 
A 9.0 magnitude earthquake shook the east coast of Japan on March 11, 
2011, which was followed by a destructive tsunami.  This disaster lead to 
catastrophic losses: it was reported that by the end of 2011 15,457 persons 
died, 5,349 persons were injured, 7,676 persons were missing, and over 
125,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed as a consequence of the 
tsunami.284  Moreover, the tsunami led to a second catastrophe in Japan, the 
core melt down in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, which is located 
near the east coast.  The power plant is designed by General Electric (GE) 
and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).  Before 
the earthquake, three of the six reactors in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power 
Plant had been shut down for maintenance.  Shortly after the earthquake, the 
other three reactors were shut down automatically.  However, even after the 
shutting down of the nuclear reactors, a cooling system still had to be in 
operation to absorb the decay heat from the radioactive decay of the unstable 
isotopes.285  Cooling pumps can be either powered by on site units or offsite 
units, such as grid and diesel generators.  In the case of the Fukushima I 
Power Plant, all the emergency electricity generators were located in the 
basement of the Turbine Building at the moment of the earthquake.  The 
seawall of the power plant was designed to protect the plant from a 5.7 meter 
flood.  However, unfortunately, a 13 meter maximum height tsunami 
                                                                                                                   
 284 See JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY, DAMAGE SITUATION AND POLICE 
COUNTERMEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH 2011 TOHOKU DISTRICT – OFF THE PACIFIC OCEAN 
EARTHQUAKE, available at http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2014); JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY,  2(2011) 	

 [THE DAMAGE OF T?HOKU EARTHQUAKE OF 2011], available at 
http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 285 See Jay Friess & Andy Marso, What If It Happened Here? Evacuation Zones Outlined in 
Case of Emergency at Calvert Cliffs, SOMDNEWS, http://www.somdnews.com/stories/032320 
11/rectop133917_32384.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
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followed the earthquake and arrived at Fukushima.286  This led to flooding in 
the turbining building, including the power units, and further causing the 
failure of the cooling system.  This was followed by a series of accidents, 
including full meltdown in three reactors, hydrogen explosions and leaking 
of cooling water.287  This serious accident was later rated as International 
Nuclear Event Scale 7, parallel with only the Chernobyl Accident in the 
history of nuclear industry.288 
This nuclear accident is a typical example that is caused by a combination 
of natural disaster and human contribution.  It is directly triggered by the 
tsunami following the catastrophic earthquake.  However, a careful 
examination shows that human factors are involved as well.  For example, 
the design of placing emergency electricity generators in the basement of the 
turbine building makes them very vulnerable to flooding risk.  It was 
reported that the designer, GE, was aware of such risk since 1970s.289  
However, both GE and TEPCO did nothing to reduce such risk since then.  
Moreover, there is even criticism claiming TEPCO choose to locate their 
power plant in such a vulnerable place on purpose to externalize the potential 
costs created by an accident.290  Under this situation, the question arises 
whether a natural disaster can be used as a defense to exonerate the nuclear 
operator from liability.  This question can only be answered after an 
examination of the nuclear liability legislation in Japan. 
2.  Legal Framework of Nuclear Liability in Japan 
Japan is a country relying heavily on nuclear energy: it is reported that the 
generating capacity of nuclear power plants composed approximately 20% of 
                                                                                                                   
 286 Pillip Lipsy et al., The Fukushima Disaster and  Japan’s Nuclear Plant Vulnerability in 
Comparative Perspective, ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6083 (2013), available at http://www.stanfor 
d.edu/~plipscy/LipscyKushidaIncertiEST2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 287 See Japan ‘Unprepared’ for Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/worldasiapacific13678627. 
 288 The IAEA introduced International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) system in 1990 to 
classify the significance of nuclear and radiological events.  According to INES, events are 
divided into seven levels, with ten times difference in severity between each adjacent scale 
levels.  See Factsheets & FAQs, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea. 
org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 289 Norihiko Shirouzu & Chester Dawson, Design Flaw Fueled Nuclear Disaster, WALL ST. 
J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822.html. 
 290 See J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: 
The Case of Japan, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 457 (2012).   
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the total power generation capacity of Japan as of 2009.291  However, Japan 
is not a party to any of the above mentioned nuclear liability conventions.  
This might be because Japan has no land-border with other countries with 
nuclear power.  Hence, Japan’s need to handle cross-border damage is not as 
marked as e.g., in Europe.  Besides, other nearby Asian countries with 
nuclear power, such as China and South Korea did not join the international 
conventions either.292  Four instruments largely compose the Japanese 
nuclear liability legislation: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
(Act on Compensation), the Order for the Execution of the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Order on Compensation), the Act on 
Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Act on 
Indemnity) and the Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity 
Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Order on Indemnity).293  
This section briefly sketches the principles under the legislation. 
Japanese nuclear liability legislation has a few similar characteristics as 
those of the international conventions.  For example, a channeled strict 
liability and compulsory financial security are also adopted in the Japanese 
system.  Section 3 of the Act on Compensation is titled “Liability without 
fault, channeling of liability” and reads: 
Where nuclear damage is caused as a result of reactor operation 
etc. during such operation, the nuclear operator who is engaged 
in the reactor operation etc. on this occasion shall be liable for 
the damage, except in the case where the damage is caused by a 
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an 
insurrection.294 
This section holds the nuclear operator liable for damage, and fault is not 
a requirement to establish liability.  The channeling of liability is further 
                                                                                                                   
 291 See JAPAN NUCLEAR ENERGY SAFETY ORG., CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
IN JAPAN 1 (2010), http://www.atom-library.jnes.go.jp/unkan/e-unkanhp1/e-unkanhp1-2010/ 
book1/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 292 Toyohiro Nomura et al., Japan’s Nuclear Liability System, in OECD/NEA, JAPAN’S 
COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE: AS RELATED TO THE TEPCO FUKUSHIMA 
DAIICHI NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 27, 27 (2012).  See on nuclear liability in China Liu Jing and 
Michael Faure, Compensating Nuclear Damage in China, 11(4) WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 781 (2012). 
 293 Copies of English translation can be found at the website of NEA, see http://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/legislation/japan.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 294 Act on Compensation, Section 3. 
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clarified in Section 4, which requires no other person other than the nuclear 
operator to be liable.295  Section 3 also stipulates the exonerations available 
for nuclear operators: the damage caused by a grave natural disaster of an 
exceptional character or by a serious social disturbance.  This is in line with 
the first generation of international nuclear liability conventions.  The terms 
used in the conventions are “act of armed conflict, hostility, civil war or 
insurrection.”  There is no significant difference between these words and the 
term “serious social disturbance.”296  In the second generation of 
international conventions, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character 
is precluded from the exonerations.  However, this is still an available 
defense in Japan. 
The Japanese nuclear liability system is different from the international 
system, with one difference being uncapped liability in Japan, as opposed to 
capped liability in the international context.297  Hence, the liable party in 
Japan has to pay the entire cost of danger it caused as long as it is solvent.  In 
spite of the unlimited liability, there is a ceiling for the financial security 
required from nuclear operators.  The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage requires different levels of financial security from different types of 
nuclear operators, varying from 4 billion yen (U.S. $40 million) to 120 
billion yen (U.S. $1.15 billion).298  The operators can choose to use different 
types of instruments to realize such financial obligation, such as liability 
insurance, an indemnity agreement with the government, or a deposit 
approved by the competent authority.299   
Japanese nuclear operators, like their international counterparts, primarily 
use liability insurance to provide financial security.  Considering the 
potential catastrophic nature of a nuclear accident, insurers often pool 
together to provide insurance coverage.  In Japan, the Japan Atomic Energy 
Insurance Pool (JAEIP), which is comprised of forty-three insurance 
companies, provides nuclear liability insurance.  However, it is worth noting 
                                                                                                                   
 295 Act on Compensation, Section 4.  
 296 See Hisashi Tanikawa, The Amendment of the Law on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage in Japan, in REFORM OF CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY: INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, 
BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, 31 MAY–3 JUNE 1999 (OECD/NEA), 533–34 (2000). 
 297 Julius Weitzdörfer, ‘Die Haftung für Nuklearschäden nach japanischem Atomrecht – 
Rechtsprobleme der Reaktorkatastrofe von Fukushima I’, Zeitschrift für Japanisches Recht 31 
J. JAPANESE L. 61, 70–71 (2011) [Liability for Nuclear Damages pursuant to Japanese Atomic 
Law – Legal Problems Arising from the Fukushima I Nuclear Accident]. 
 298 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 7; Order for the Execution 
of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 2.  
 299 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 7.  
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that certain types of risks are excluded from insurance coverage, including 
the damage caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or 
by a serious social disturbance.300  
The indemnity agreements provide nuclear operators with an opportunity 
to provide financial security, when a certain risk is excluded by insurance 
and other instruments.  The market is reluctant to provide coverage for such 
risks, like nuclear damage caused by natural disasters, damage happening ten 
years after the accident and damage caused by normal operation since they 
are regarded as unpredictable.301  As discussed earlier, only when a grave 
natural disaster is classified as “of an exceptional character” can it be used to 
exonerate the operator from liability.  For damage caused by other natural 
disasters, the operator is still liable.  In this case, he can cover the risk 
through an indemnity agreement.  The operator has to pay an indemnity fee 
as the price of coverage.  The Cabinet Order shall decide the indemnity rate 
according to the probability of damage and the government expenditures.302  
The rate of indemnity is set as 3/10,000 or 1.5/10,000, depending on types of 
facilities before the Fukushima accident.  The government has the authority 
to increase the rate if the amount available for indemnifying nuclear damage 
under an indemnity agreement is insufficient to cover the amount laid down 
by said agreement at the time of payment.303 
A nuclear accident could be catastrophic, leading to losses well above the 
required financial security and the operator’s own assets.  In such a case, 
many victims may be left undercompensated or even uncompensated.  In 
response to such situations, the enacted Act on Compensation gives the 
government discretion to provide aid to operators.304  This Act also requires 
the government to take measures to relieve victims and to prevent further 
damage.305 
 
                                                                                                                   
 300 Liability insurance for nuclear installations, common clause, 2000 (Clause 2000), Article 7.  
As cited in Oba Hirokazu, Nuclear Damage and Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage, 51 
OTIA U. ECON. REV. 21, 33–34 (2000 (in Japanese) (  	
, , 
   51(6), 21–47 (2000)). 
 301 Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 2.  
 302 Id. § 6.  
 303 Order for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of 
Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 3.  
 304 Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 16. 
 305 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 17.  
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3.  Compensation for the Fukushima Accident in Practice 
Regarding compensation for the Fukushima accident, the first question 
that needs to be answered is whether the earthquake and tsunami can be used 
as an exoneration to prevent the establishment of liability.  Although the 9.0 
magnitude earthquake is very significant and led to catastrophic losses, the 
government was reluctant to admit that the disaster was “of an exceptional 
character” and held TEPCO fully responsible for the damage it caused.  This 
is because the east coast of Japan is very vulnerable to earthquakes.  Hence, a 
significant earthquake is not unpredictable in such areas.  Furthermore, some 
argued that experts had warned that an earthquake might lead to a nuclear 
accident at the Fukushima power plant, and TEPCO should have been aware 
of such a risk.306  
A Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation 
was established shortly after the accident to ascertain the scope of the 
damage and to promote compensation.307  The Committee published several 
guidelines on the scope of compensable damage,308 which broadly includes 
personal damage, property damage, and even some pure economic losses.309  
In addition to these types of individual damages, the Fukushima accident led 
to environmental damage.  To promote the decontamination from the 
environmental damage, the Act on Special Measures concerning the 
Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged 
by NPS Associated with the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean 
Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011 (Act on Measures for 
                                                                                                                   
 306 See Weitzdörfer, supra note 297, at 76–77. 
 307 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage allows the establishment of such a 
Committee; the Committee shall be “in charge of mediating reconciliation of any dispute 
arising from compensation of nuclear damage and of preparing general instructions to help 
operators reach a voluntary settlement of such disputes.”  See Act on Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage, supra note 293, § 18. 
 308 For the content of guidance in Japanese, see http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baish 
o/jiko_baisho/index.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
  An English translation of these guidelines can be found at: OECD/NEA, Japan’s 
Compensation System for Nuclear Damage, As Related to the TEPCO Fukushiam Daiichi 
Nuclear Accident, 89–184 (2012), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/fukushima/7089-
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Environmental Pollution) was adopted.310   The Act requires the national 
government, local government, and TEPCO to work together to 
decontaminate the polluted environment and dispose of nuclear waste.311 
As discussed earlier, nuclear damage caused by natural disaster is not 
covered by liability insurance.  The government provides indemnification up 
to 120 billion yen.  After the accident, the insurance pool JAEIP refused to 
renew the insurance contract in 2012 and continues to refuse, because the 
Fukushima I power plant has not been restored to normal status and has been 
categorized as creating consistent risks.  After the government paid for 
indemnification, the indemnity rate relating to nuclear reactors with thermal 
outputting exceeding 10,000 was increased from 3/10,000 to 20/10,000.312  
Though the exact amount for the total losses caused by the Fukushima 
accident is currently unknown, it is estimated to be much higher than 120 
billion yen (U.S. $1.15 billion).  The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency estimates that the 
first-year compensation amount was 1.25 trillion yen (U.S. $10 billion) and 
the compensation for the second year and beyond was 897.2 billion yen per 
year.313  Compensating for the remaining losses is a challenge.  Not 
surprisingly, the government chose to intervene in response to this 
catastrophe.  Passed on August 3, 2011, the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage 
Compensation Facilitation Corporation created a specific organization and 
system of financing for compensation.314  The Compensation Facilitation 
Corporation can provide compensatory support to operators in two forms: the 
ordinary financial assistance approved by the management committee of the 
Corporation and the special financial assistance approved by the competent 
minister.  A special business plan would have to be formulated in the latter 
case.  Under such a plan, the Corporation can get support from government 
                                                                                                                   
 310 Act on Measures for Environmental Pollution, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/ch 
ousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/09/21/1311103_13_2.pdf (last visited Jan. 
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 311 Act on Measures for Environmental Pollution, arts. 43–45.  
 312 Nomura et al., supra note 292, at 20.  
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bonds or from financial institutions with the guarantee of the government.  
Then, the Corporation can provide monetary support to the nuclear operator 
for compensation, which needs to be paid back in the following years by the 
supported operator in the form of special contributions.  The other nuclear 
power plant operators must to pay general contributions as well.  Hence, a 
mutual support system is established under the Act.315 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The starting point for this Article was the question of whether the ancient 
paradigm that there can be no liability for an Act of God still holds.  The 
recent March 2011 Fukushima incident in Japan, along with many other 
technological disasters, show that there are, in fact, blurring boundaries 
between natural and man-made disasters.  A natural phenomenon—like a 
flood, earthquake or tsunami—turns into a disaster due to the intervention of 
men.  
The question we addressed in this Article: to what extent should a natural 
disaster be considered an Act of God such that an operator is completely 
excluded from liability when the subsequent technological accident takes 
place.  Using a simple economic model, we explained that this is, in fact, a 
case of two contributing causes: a man-made cause (failure to intervene) and 
a natural cause.  Economic logic dictates that if the damage would not have 
occurred but for the human intervention, the operator should be held liable 
for the damage.  Only when the operator merely partially contributed to the 
loss (such as his failure to take adequate preventive measures) can there be 
proportional liability (like in the case of causal uncertainty).  Still, there 
would be very few reasons to argue in favor of total exclusion of liability, 
even if the incident was caused by a natural disaster. 
The original nuclear liability conventions were relatively lenient toward 
the operator, providing for exoneration if the nuclear accident was caused by 
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.  However, the legislation 
of the contracting party could provide to the contrary.  After the Chernobyl 
disaster, the second generation nuclear conventions excluded this 
exoneration.  Moreover, nuclear liability law in Japan, where this 
exoneration still exists, requires a critical assessment as to whether the grave 
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natural disaster was of an exceptional character.  The Japanese government 
rightly held that an earthquake, even a serious one, can hardly be considered 
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character, excluding liability of the 
operator.  
The economic logic of exposing operators to liability, even if a 
technological accident was trigged by a natural disaster, is obvious: ex ante 
knowledge of liability exposure efficiently incentivizes operators to consider 
grave natural hazards and accordingly choose appropriate care, appropriate 
activity levels, proper location, and proper design.  The experience with the 
Fukushima incident shows that this may be quite important. 
Thus, there will be relatively little room for excluding the liability of 
operators in the case of a natural disaster, which is also consistent with U.S. 
case law.  Only when the natural disaster is grave, unforeseeable, and 
unprecedented and human intervention could not have prevented the loss 
may there be exoneration from liability.  However, with increasing 
technological possibilities, it will be even harder for operators to argue that a 
natural hazard was the sole cause of the loss.  Of course, as the Indonesian 
Lapindo Mudflow case shows, there may be uncertainty as to whether a 
natural disaster (like an earthquake) or man-made action (such as the drilling 
operation) caused the damage.  However, the Lapindo case illustrates the 
crucial importance of correctly allocating the burden of proof regarding 
casual uncertainty, which is consistent with U.S. case law, by forcing the 
operator to show that he took all measures to prevent the damage from 
occurring, notwithstanding the natural hazard.  Moreover, the presence of 
causal uncertainty is not a reason to rule out liability of the operator 
altogether; at best, liability ought to be proportional to the extent that the 
operator’s activity contributed to the loss. 
However, the histories of the Indonesian court case and the nuclear 
liability conventions show that when high financial interests are at stake, 
industry lobbying affecting court adjudication and formulation of liability 
rules is a constant risk.  Even if the international nuclear liability conventions 
exclude the “grave natural hazard of an exceptional character” standard, the 
construction of the liability regime in the international content is still far 
from efficient.  Features such as exclusive channeling of liability to the 
operator, low limits in liability, and public funding awarding a large subsidy 
to the nuclear industry are clearly not in line with the economic principles of 
efficient accident law, and can only be explained as the results of efficient 
lobbying by the particular industry involved. 
 
